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 Summary 
We are inclined to trust our feeling of control or sense of agency although it results from 
our subjective perception and construction of the world—hence, it can be inaccurate (Moore, 
2016). Sense of agency serves central social functions such as the attribution of social or legal 
responsibility (Haggard, 2017; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore, 2016), but how can we gauge 
under which circumstances we can rely on our sense of agency?    
The goal of this thesis was to understand what factors bias and impact our feeling of control 
as these findings have implications for the extent of legal culpability and criminal sentencing. 
Specifically, we focused on factors in personality that have been found to increase risk of criminal 
behaviour and emotional states that have shown varying effects on other cognitive and perceptual 
processes. The previously postulated dopamine hypothesis (Aarts et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2015; 
Moore et al., 2010) served as an underlying rationale throughout. Sense of agency was measured 
with an implicit paradigm called intentional binding (Haggard et al., 2002), referring to the 
subjective compression of the time between a self-initiated action and its perceived outcome 
(Haggard et al., 2002). 
In the first study, we measured interindividual differences in personality and substance use 
history as a proxy for low dopaminergic states and found reduced intentional binding in substance 
users and individuals with higher vulnerable narcissism—preliminary evidence for the dopamine 
hypothesis (Render & Jansen, 2019).  
In the second study (Render & Jansen, 2020), a state of sexual arousal was induced, which 
has previously been found to be associated with a high dopaminergic activity, and its influence on 
the intentional binding components—action binding and outcome binding—was analysed. Action 
binding represents the feeling of control in action performance. Outcome binding displays how 
much actions are linked to the consequences; it detects the level of awareness of consequences. No 
specific effects of sexual arousal were observed in the second study, but unspecific general arousal 
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was associated with impaired action binding while outcome binding remained intact. These results 
rejected a linear relationship between intentional binding and dopamine potentially suggesting an 
inverted U-function. The results also indicated that action binding is more closely connected to the 
dopaminergic system than outcome binding (Tanaka et al., 2019). 
Finally, by merging the designs of the first two studies in the third study (Render et al., 
under review), we partially replicated, and expanded upon the previous results: We investigated the 
interactional effects of the emotional states (sexual arousal and pleasure) and personality traits. In 
addition to subjective ratings, manipulation check for arousal induction was performed and 
partially confirmed in pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate on a physiological level. 
Dopaminergic activity was indexed via spontaneous eye blink rates. Findings of this third study 
revealed that sexual arousal specifically impaired both binding components but results for action 
binding were more pronounced, underscored by effects of blink rates. Personality traits interacted 
with the response to emotional states showing that individuals with higher vulnerable narcissism 
had reduced action and outcome binding in sexual arousal and reduced outcome binding in 
pleasure. Higher anxiety showed reduced action binding and increased outcome binding in all 
emotional states. Higher psychopathy was associated with intact action binding in sexual arousal 
but reduced outcome binding in sexual arousal and pleasure. Individuals reporting more substance 
use history, showed increased action and outcome binding when sexually aroused as well as 
increased outcome binding in pleasure. 
Our results underline the importance of personality for the feeling of control in highly 
emotional states. Sexual arousal impairs the feeling of control over actions and individuals scoring 
high on vulnerable narcissism seemed to be more vulnerable to show a reduced feeling of agency 
in emotional states. In contrast, people reporting high substance use history and individuals scoring 
higher on psychopathy and lower on trait anxiety seemed to be more resilient to that. The latter 
also showed a reduction in the feeling of control over consequences which did not occur in other 
participants indicating a psychological distancing moment from the action outcome. The 
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interaction between constant interindividual differences based on personality traits and temporary 
intraindividual adjustments induced by emotional states in the feeling of control bridges the gap 
between these research fields showing a more holistic picture of our feeling of control under 
different circumstances. Variance in feeling of control in emotional states is important for 
evaluations of criminal responsibility. If the feeling of control is reduced, this could result in 
limitations of responsibility—total or partial exemption from criminal liability—for psychological 
and psychiatric expert reports regarding compulsory admission and treatment. 
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1. Preface 
When we act voluntary, we do not to feel as though actions simply happen to us, we tend 
to feel as though we are in charge. The sense of  agency refers to this feeling of  being in the driving 
seat when acting. However, as with other aspects of  conscious experience, this perception is not a 
one-to-one reproduction of  the reality in an objective sense. In other words, our experience of  
agency can be flawed. Even though we tend to feel immune to such cognitive failures, we are almost 
certainly mistaken trusting our beliefs at some point (Moore, 2016). The buttons at pedestrian 
crossings for example create the illusion of  us being able to make the light go green. However, 
many of  these buttons are in fact not doing anything, instead a timer is being used to regulate the 
traffic lights (McRaney, 2013). Intriguingly, most of  us fail to notice the lack of  a causal linkage 
between our button press and the green light. But what is so fascinating about these lapses in our 
sense of  agency? First, it reminds us, that the accuracy of  this experience is not a given. Our brain 
is constantly constructing the sense of  agency, using predictive and postdictive external and internal 
signals that can lead to a false interpretation of  the reality. Second, these lapses reveal something 
quite remarkable about our sense of  agency: its impressive flexibility (Moore, 2016). Extensive 
research has explored determinants that challenge our sense of agency’s flexibility. It can depend 
on personality as trait-like interindividual differences and it can vary depending on negative 
emotional states, requiring us to adjust our sense of agency temporarily.  
It is not fully understood what underlying mechanism exactly make our sense of  agency so 
flexible yet, but several researchers in this field have suggested that the accessibility of  dopamine 
might be able to explain inter- and intraindividual differences in the binding strength between 
actions and consequences. Still, operationalisations of  the dopamine hypothesis have not been met. 
Drawing attention to the field in which sense of  agency is considered crucial for an individual’s 
outcome—criminality—we were led by the following questions: Do we differ systematically in our 
sense of  agency according to our personality traits? Is the sense of  agency impaired in negative 
states only, or do ambivalent or positive states have the same influence? And does the response to 
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emotional states interact with individual characteristics that are linked to variations in anxiety or 
arousal reactivity? 
 This thesis attempts to get a step closer to understand the link between the sense of  agency 
and the dopaminergic system, how flexible the sense of  agency really is, and what circumstances 
may impair our sense of  agency.  
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2. Theoretical Background and State of Research 
We are agents—engaging in actions and perceiving the outcomes—which makes us realise 
that we are changing the world around us. This experience of having the capacity to bring change 
into the world is called the sense of agency. A key challenge of the sense of agency research is the 
discovery and evaluation of measures, particularly implicit measures, as a divergence between 
explicit and implicit measures has been reported (e.g. Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). One approach to 
capture the sense of agency implicitly is via intentional binding, a measure that has received 
considerable interest and has been used extensively in research (Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
2.1 Sense of Agency  
Usually, we feel as though we are in control of what we do, at least more often than we 
don’t—this means our feeling of control is intact—even if the degree of consciousness for our 
actions and action outcomes varies. The term ‘sense of agency’ refers to this experience of 
controlling one’s own actions, and, through these actions, events in the outside world (Haggard & 
Chambon, 2012). Sense of agency is also defined by naming the cause of action (Gallagher, 2000), 
it is essential to explain changes in the external world and a foundation for one’s future predictions 
(Wen et al., 2015). This knowledge, to be the cause of one’s own action, is an elementary and 
constant root for the interaction with the world (Synofzik et al., 2013).  
But why is sense of agency important? A substantial amount of mental illnesses, such as 
psychotic episodes, involve abnormalities of agency in which actions feel as though they were not 
their own and feel imposed by some other agent. Another example is depression as it goes along 
with the experience of helplessness and loss of agency. However, sense of agency is not only 
relevant in clinical settings. Focus of this work is, that it also plays part in the foundation for our 
society more generally: the idea that we are responsible for our own actions is built on the 
assumption that we have a sense of control for our actions and that we are aware of the 
consequences (Haggard & Chambon, 2012). In Germany, this is even rooted within the law 
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requiring a person to be legally culpable if they are to be found guilty of a crime (§20 
Schuldunfähigkeit wegen seelischer Störungen, §21 verminderte Schuldfähigkeit StGB).   
In order to understand how sense of agency arises, two neurocognitive origin models, the 
prediction model and the retrospective inference model have been proposed, investigated and 
widely discussed (Hughes et al., 2013; Moore & Obhi, 2012; Tanaka et al., 2019). The predictive 
model suggests that the sense of agency is generated by processes associated with control of 
voluntary action. Predictions about future states of the motor system and about sensory 
consequences of movement are needed for efficient motor control and learning (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000). The internal forward model provides these predictions in two different classes: 
forward dynamic, capturing the dynamics of bodily movement, and forward sensory, capturing the 
causal relation between movements and their sensory consequences. According to the ‘comparator 
model’ (Blakemore et al., 2002) of the sense of agency, the forward sensory model generates 
predictions of likely sensory consequences of movements based on an efference copy of motor 
commands. A predicted state is generated from an efference copy of one’s motor command and is 
compared with an approximate actual state. A match between predicted and actual sensory 
consequences of movement produces the sense of agency, whereas a mismatch implies that the 
effect could have potentially been produced by others (Blakemore et al., 2002). 
The second model explaining the sense of agency origin is the retrospective inference 
model minimizing the specific contribution of the motor system to generate the sense of agency. 
To generate the sense of agency by retrospective inference, we use sensory information producing 
the causal origins of an action and its consequences. According to the ‘theory of apparent mental 
causation’ (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), three conditions have to be met to promote the sense of 
agency: a thought or intention that, first, occurs prior to action, second, is consistent with the 
action, and third, is the most plausible cause of the action. By evaluating studies that operationalise 
these two different models, it has been concluded that both, prediction and retrospective inference, 
contribute to sense of agency (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Sense of agency can be measured implicitly 
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via intentional binding (also called temporal binding) and sensory attenuation (Dewey & Knoblich, 
2014). Both measures presuppose that we perceive self-initiated actions and their outcomes 
differently than ones that were involuntary or that were performed by other’s.  
2.2 Sensory Attenuation 
Sensory attenuation builds on the assumption that self-initiated action-effects are perceived 
less intense subjectively, e.g. less loud, than actions caused by others or machines (Sato, 2008; Weiss 
et al., 2011). This effect can also be seen on a neurological level, in reduced auditory sensory-
perceptual processing (N1 component) for self-initiated actions (Baess et al., 2009). However, the 
link between sensory attenuation and the sense of agency is still preliminary as the necessary 
preconditions are controversy (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). Therefore, most of these studies 
investigating the underlying processes of sense of agency rely on an implicit paradigm called 
‘intentional binding’. 
2.3 Intentional Binding 
Measuring sense of agency via intentional binding presupposes that when an action is 
intentional and feels controlled by the actor, a binding effect can be observed: the time between 
action and event is perceived as shorter than it really is; in other words, there is a subjective 
compression of time between an action and its outcome (Haggard et al., 2002).  
Intentional binding can be quantified with different tasks, such as the Libet clock and the 
interval estimation (also interval reproduction) task. In the Libet clock task, participants report the 
onset time of certain events, which can either be voluntary performed actions (e.g. key presses) or 
sensory outcomes (e.g. presentation of tones) via the position of a clock hand. Dependent on the 
condition, events can occur in isolation (baseline condition) or action and outcome can occur in 
the same trial (operant condition) separated by a short interval (e.g. 250ms). Temporal binding is 
measured through the time estimation error of actions and outcomes in comparison to the baseline 
trials. In voluntary actions, two perceptual shifts can be observed indicating an attraction of action 
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and outcome: actions that caused a sensory outcome were experienced later and outcomes were 
experienced earlier in the operant conditions, as compared to events in the baseline condition. This 
effect is unique for voluntary actions; reversed effects were shown for involuntary movements: 
When an action was induced via transcranial magnetic stimulation over the primary motor cortex, 
participants perceived the onset of their action earlier and the onset of the tone later than in the 
baseline condition (Haggard et al., 2002; Tanaka et al., 2019).  
While time estimations for actions and outcomes in the Libet task are made with visual 
reference—an analogue clock rotating faster than usual—the interval estimation task is constructed 
without such a visual reference. Time estimations are performed by reproductions of the subjective 
length of a previously experienced event: after hearing two tones separated by different intervals, 
participants are asked to reproduce the length of the tone by pressing a key for the estimated time 
of the interval. In the passive condition, both tones are generated by the computer, in the active 
condition, the first tone is caused by a key press of the participant. Temporal binding occurs in the 
active conditions only (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013). Although 
temporal binding effects revealed by interval reproduction are presumed to be driven by the 
perception of a causal relationship between two events, it does not necessarily involve intentionality 
or agency. The Libet clock method in contrast allows to differentiate between shifts in the 
perceived time of actions and their effects, the so-called event boundaries (Dewey & Knoblich, 
2014). Shifts in event boundaries could occur independently of changes in the representation of 
the temporal interval separating the two events (Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). By relying on event 
boundaries rather than the temporal intervals per se, the Libet Clock task is possibly better suited 
to modulate self-agency than the interval estimation task. Evidence for this can be found in a meta-
analysis showing larger effect sizes task for the Libet Clock task compared to the interval estimation 
procedure casting doubts of the validity to detect subtle differences in binding derived from the 
manipulation of sensorimotor parameters in the interval estimation task (Tanaka et al., 2019).  
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In the Libet Clock task, temporal binding is indicated by a forward shift in the judged time 
of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward a 
causal action (outcome binding) (Lush et al., 2019) (Figure 1). These components of  intentional 
binding—action and outcome binding—are driven by distinct underlying mechanisms and should 
therefore be considered separately (Tanaka et al., 2019; Wolpe et al., 2013; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014). 
Figure 1 
Intentional binding paradigm. Finger = key press, eye = perceived time of key press, speaker = tone, ear = perceived 
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2.3.1 Components of Intentional Binding 
As such, action and outcome binding have more frequently been interpreted as two separate 
cues for time estimations in recent research (Christensen et al., 2019; Saito et al., 2017; Tanaka et 
al., 2019; Wolpe et al., 2013). Thus, it is more informative, as the behavioural pattern of each 
binding component can provide insight into the processes regulating them (Tanaka et al., 2019; 
Wolpe & Rowe, 2014). Understanding these underlying processes of intentional binding may 
contribute to comprehend the mechanisms underpinning abnormal experience of agency. As yet it 
is presumed that action binding—the perceptual attraction of a voluntary action towards its 
outcome—is more dependent on a sense of control of outcome onsets with voluntary actions 
(Tanaka et al., 2019), as it is built on the learned action-effect association (Moore & Haggard, 2008). 
Outcome binding—the perceptual attraction of an outcome towards a voluntary action—whereas, 
depends more on the degree to which participants can predict, rather than control, the action 
outcome onsets (Tanaka et al., 2019), as it relies on a pre-activation mechanism (Waszak et al., 
2012). But what factors determine our ability to predict and control actions?  
2.4 Dopamine Hypothesis 
A physiological determinant for our feeling of control that several researchers have 
postulated is the accessibility or activity of dopamine (Aarts et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2015; Moore 
et al., 2010). The manner of relationship between the dopaminergic system and intentional control 
has not yet been understood. Dopamine is involved in responses to attention-inducing stimuli and 
reward-related stimuli (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). It is part of the motivational reward system 
(Berridge, 2007; Wittmann et al., 2005), involved in memory formation, motoric functions (Volkow 
et al., 1998) and regulates the prediction of errors in action results (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000) and 
executive control (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005).  
Building on this assumption—reward and positive affect playing an important role in the 
control of voluntary action—one study tested the effects of pictures with positive valence via 
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priming and found enhanced intentional binding by modulating dopamine functioning (Aarts et 
al., 2012). This positive priming effect was more pronounced in participants with higher 
dopaminergic activity, i.e. indicated by higher blink rates. The authors suggest an involvement of 
striatal dopamine activity in the evaluation process of oneself as an active agent in reward-related 
information. Thus, the activity of dopamine could increase the temporal binding of action and 
event through higher action coherence and self-causation, hence a higher sense of agency. 
According to this theory, individuals with a low dopamine level will not profit from reward signals 
in their sense of agency (Aarts et al., 2012).  
An involvement of the dopaminergic system in intentional binding has also been found for 
schizophrenia (Haggard et al., 2003; Hauser et al., 2011; Hur et al., 2014; Voss et al., 2010), 
schizotypy (Asai & Tanno, 2008), psychosis-like experiences and age (Graham et al., 2015), as well 
as ketamine as a model for psychosis (Moore et al., 2011). It has been suggested that altered action 
binding indicates deficits in the dopaminergic system involved in action execution (Tanaka & 
Kawabata, 2019). Since associative learning is strongly influenced by dopamine (Arias-Carrión & 
Pöppel, 2007; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2002) and action binding is generated from learned 
action-effect associations (Moore & Haggard, 2008), changes in action binding are more likely to 
depend on dopamine changes than in outcome binding. Effects on action binding have been 
reported for Parkinson patients with dopaminergic medication (Moore et al., 2010; Saito et al., 
2017), in testosterone administration (as testosterone induces dopamine release) (van der 
Westhuizen et al., 2017), for general arousal (Wen et al., 2015), and for negative arousal states such 
as fear and anger (Christensen et al., 2019)—states that all interact with dopaminergic circuits 
(Chester et al., 2016; Cho et al., 2017; Fadok et al., 2009). According to this, emotional states can 
lead to short-term adaptations emphasising the flexibility of our sense of agency intraindividually: 
The state of control of an individual has been shown to be determined by their emotional state 
during the performance of actions (Christensen et al., 2019) as a function of arousal and valence 
of the emotional state. 
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2.5 Intraindividual Differences: Emotional States 
 But why does it matter whether sense of agency is responsive to emotional states? Driven 
by different aims, two studies have been conducted inducing high arousing emotional states and 
have thus built the foundation for our work. 
One reason to induce high unspecific arousal as a part of attention was to examine which 
underlying processes were involved in intentional binding. It was argued, that attention is defined 
as an implicit process contributing to the integration of individual features into one object in visual 
perception (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), hence when manipulating arousal, external cues would not 
be provided, and the reconstructive processes involved in intentional binding would remain 
unaffected. If intentional binding would be increased nonetheless, arousal would have enhanced 
prospective processes confirming that reconstructive and prospective processes are involved in 
intentional binding.  
Another aim to test the effect of arousal on sense of agency was to simulate situations in 
court dealing with loss of control in legal defence. Therefore, the influence of negative arousing 
states on intentional binding was examined. It was argued, that fear and anger are assumed to 
attenuate the responsibility over one’s own actions, although the effects of negative aroused states 
on sense of agency had not been investigated until then. The defendant’s emotional state prior to 
and during the action performance is more likely to be considered for the sentence than the 
emotional quality of the outcome, therefore, it was tested whether negative emotional states would 
reduce action binding. A possible inference for this reduction is a psychological distancing from 
outcomes since they are linked to a negative valence. 
Along with fear and anger, sexual arousal is categorised as a hot emotion. Hot emotions 
are direct visceral reactions to risk and can inhibit our rational thinking and the ability to act 
intentionally (van Gelder, 2013). Hence, sexual arousal exerts a strong influence on our behaviour 
which may result in criminal behaviour (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006) and can lead to psychological 
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distancing from action outcomes. Normally, cues of non-consent should inhibit sexual arousal, but 
sometimes this inhibition process is interrupted or has not even been acquired (W. L. Marshall et 
al., 1990). This stimulus inhibition theory points out that emotional states, such as sexual arousal 
and pleasure, can co-occur with the offense, making these states as important for agency research 
as negative emotional states. Positive moods such as happiness and pleasure have been suggested 
to facilitate underestimation of risks and engagement in reckless activities like speeding or sexual 
harassment (van Gelder, 2013). More attention should therefore be drawn to positive and 
ambiguous arousing states.  
Previous studies focusing on the valence of the consequences rather than the state of action 
shows that the effect of equally arousing emotional stimuli on sense of agency also depends on 
their valence: Studies using financial incentives or emotional sounds as action outcomes, revealed 
that negative outcomes reduced intentional binding relative to neutral outcomes. Yet, enhancing 
effects of positive outcomes on intentional binding were neglectable relative to neutral outcomes 
(Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). In these studies, 
arousal cannot explain such valence-dependent effects since positive and negative stimuli were 
rated as equally arousing. Looking at the effect of valence in low arousing states could therefore be 
the key to understand the effects of valence separated from high arousal. As emotional states are 
often treated as two-dimensional—with one being arousal and one being valence (Barrett, 1998)— 
separating the state of art by these two dimensions could clarify to what extent each of them has 
an effect on sense of agency.  
2.5.1 High Arousal 
2.5.1.1 Neutral Valence 
In one of the two studies, the influence of emotionally neutral arousal on intentional 
binding (overall binding) has been operationalised using movement and colours (Wen et al., 2015). 
Three squares (a = 60-mm) appeared on a screen, with the central one differing in colour. The 
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external squares moved upwards with a speed of 18 mm/s, one at a time at random intervals to 
avoid a ceiling effect of agency ratings. As soon as participants pressed the space key, the central 
square started to move. Arousal was induced by the colour of the central square, being either red 
or black. In this specific type of interval-estimation task, participants estimated the length of the 
interval between the act of pressing the space key and the central square jumping event. For explicit 
agency, participants rated the extent to which they felt their action caused the central square to 
jump on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all to 9 = a lot). It was found that higher arousal induced by 
the red jumping squares enhanced the implicit binding process between the action and outcome. 
However, a higher state of arousal had no influence on subjective agency ratings (explicit agency). 
The results confirmed a stronger intentional binding (overall binding) in the arousal condition 
compared to the neutral condition and importantly, this enhancement was not evoked only by 
changes in time perception. These findings emphasize that subjective judgment through self-
reports and the intentional binding effect seem to reflect different facets of the construct sense of 
agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012). Wen et al. therefore suggested that the 
intentional binding effect involves predictive and inferential processes; assuming that arousal only 
enhances the predictive process. It must be noted that the arousal manipulation was only tested in 
a second experiment with 10 different participants, whereas no information about arousal check 
was provided for the participants in the actual intentional binding experiment, limiting the 
interpretation of results. 
2.5.1.2 Negative Valence 
These results were extended for emotionally negative arousing states (Christensen et al., 
2019)—fear and anger—on action binding. Action binding is specific to conditions, in which an 
action is internally generated and executed voluntarily (Borhani et al., 2017). In this sense, action 
binding provides a direct measure showing how close the mental representation of an action is 
linked to the action’s outcome (Christensen et al., 2019). Thus, in this experiment, fear was induced 
by moderately painful shocks and anger was generated by a frustration task, in which successful 
Theoretical Background and State of Research  22 
 
performance on the assignment was impossible. The negative emotion reflected the participant’s 
emotional state at the time of acting and was not linked to any specific events in the action binding 
trials. In both emotional states, the impact of fear and anger reduced action binding.  
2.5.1.3 Ambiguous Valence 
Sexual arousal can be considered as a state on the upper end of the arousal dimension and 
has been defined as rewarding (Brom et al., 2014) by stimulating dopaminergic pathways within 
different brain areas increasing concentrations of dopamine (Damsma et al., 1992; Giuliano & 
Allard, 2001; Karama et al., 2002; Oei et al., 2012; Ponseti et al., 2006; Rupp & Wallen, 2008; Stoléru 
et al., 1999). Research focusing on the constitution of sexual arousal in a laboratory setting however, 
has indicated that it not only overlaps with many positive emotions, but also with negative emotions 
(Everaerd & Kirst, 1989) such as anxiety and anger (Barclay, 1969; Barlow et al., 1983; Beck et al., 
1987; Wolchik et al., 1980). Psychophysiological studies confirmed this ambivalence of the sexual 
response: high levels of subjective sexual arousal and desire consistently co-occurred with 
ambivalent affect (e.g. Peterson & Janssen, 2007) which bears upon the influence on perception 
and cognition. There is a body of research examining the negative effects of sexual arousal on other 
cognitive processes such as perception (Most et al., 2007) or memory (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). 
Pleasant erotic distractors have been proclaimed to elicit a temporary emotion-induced blindness 
in perceptual processes. Thus, erotic stimuli have been revealed to be distracting and cannot be 
ignored confirming that a deficit in perceptive processing can be evoked by positively arousing 
stimuli to the same extent as by aversive stimuli (Most et al., 2007). Moreover, regardless of the 
valence, arousing stimuli, such as erotica and mutilation, affect attentional selectivity measured in 
binocular rivalry (Sheth & Pham, 2008), in attentional blink (Keil & Ihssen, 2004) and event related 
potentials (Schupp et al., 2007). It has also been shown that experiencing lower inhibitions in sexual 
arousal affects predictions of the individual’s own judgments, decision-making processes and 
behaviour, self-control and sexual self-restraint (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Ditto et al., 2006; 
Skakoon-Sparling et al., 2016; Skakoon-Sparling & Cramer, 2016)—processes that are likely to 
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share mechanisms with intentional binding. However, no research has been conducted to 
investigate the effect of sexual arousal on the sense of agency yet.  
2.5.2 Low Arousal 
2.5.2.1 Negative Valence 
As a state on the lower end of  the arousal dimension, previous research reports a facilitation 
effect of sadness to some extent but not generally for all cognitive processes (Chepenik et al., 2007). 
Others claim broader benefits of negative affect for cognition, emotion, and interpersonal 
behaviour (Forgas, 2014). In terms of control, sadness has shown to induce an inhibiting effect on 
aggression, aggression control seems to be higher in sad states (Lutz & Krahé, 2018). Studies have 
reported that dopamine release is increased in certain parts of the brain (the dorsal striatum: caudate 
and putamen) during processing of self-generated negative emotion of sadness (Damasio et al., 
2000) and transiently elicited sadness (George et al., 1995). However, no studies have, to the best 
of our knowledge, investigated the relationship of sadness and sense of agency yet.  
2.5.2.2 Positive Valence 
In terms of  positive valence, it has frequently been found that calm positive affect (positive 
valence) broadens cognition, promotes creative problem-solving, improves cognitive flexibility (for 
a review see Chiew & Braver, 2011), enhances working memory in controlled processing (Yang et 
al., 2013), increases awareness of intention to act (Rigoni et al., 2015) and facilitate the attribution 
of self-causation to behaviour (Deci & Ryan, 1985; D. T. Miller & Ross, 1975). First results for 
increased intentional binding have been reported for priming with positive pictures, indicating 
dopaminergic modulations (Aarts et al., 2012). A body of research has suggested that dopamine 
might, at least partially, account for the influence of positive affect on cognition. The dopaminergic 
theory of positive affect proposes that the effects of positive emotion are specifically linked to 
increased dopamine release (Ashby et al., 1999). An increased dopamine release can facilitate the 
ability to initiate a switch among goals and cognitive sets (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). A 
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dopaminergic involvement of positive affect has also been suggested for regulation of stability-
flexibility balance in cognitive control (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004).  
While emotional states challenge our sense of agency to adjust temporarily for a limited 
amount of time, interindividual differences in substance use history and personality traits could 
mirror alterations that are assumed to be more long-termed. It could be elucidating to extent this 
stream of research—sense of agency and legal culpability: simulating situations in court dealing 
with loss of control in legal defence—to risk factors for criminal behaviour: narcissism, 
psychopathy, low trait anxiety and substance use history.  
2.6 Interindividual Differences: Substance Use History and Personality   
Personality is defined as biologically based basic tendency (McCrae et al., 2000) to think, 
behave and feel in a particular way, consistent and stable over time and situations (Caspi, 1998; 
Eisenberg et al., 2000; Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987). Regulatory mechanisms in behaviour and 
feelings and the underlying motives of the personality traits are likely to contribute to these 
alterations in agency. Personality traits are thus potential determinants for the sense of agency. 
However, the term biological based highlights that the dopamine hypothesis potentially accounts 
for these interindividual differences to some extent as well.  
Studies including dopaminergic medication (Moore et al., 2010; Saito et al., 2017) or 
ketamine (Moore et al., 2011) indicate the relevance of dopamine in substances for intentional 
binding. Already 20 years ago researchers suspected that chronic use of drugs could induce changes 
in the neurotransmitter systems, particularly the dopamine system (Koob & Le Moal, 1997). Hence, 
it is important to investigate whether alterations in the dopaminergic system, caused by drug use, 
lead to differences in intentional binding. In line with the dopamine hypothesis, these determinants 
in personality traits and substance use can be singled out as potential equivalents for altered 
dopaminergic states. 
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2.6.1 Personality, Substance Use History and Dopamine 
Different dopaminergic long-term effects have been reported for the substances cannabis, 
MDMA (e.g. ecstasy), cocaine, amphetamine (e.g. speed), and psychedelics (ketamine, LSD, and 
mushrooms). 
Generally, use of cannabis, contrary to use of other substances, is not associated with striatal 
dopamine alterations. However, observable alterations such as lower dopamine release in the 
associative striatum have been found in users who started early or reported a long duration of 
usage. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of chronicity versus use onset (Urban et al., 
2012). Ecstasy (MDMA, MDEA, MDA), an activating and hallucinogenic substance, directly 
affects the neurotransmitter metabolism. In animal trials, an increase of serotonin level in the 
synaptic cleft was observed, interacting with the dopamine systems causing higher dopamine 
release (Battaglia et al., 1988). In apes, high doses changed the serotonin system irreversibly, mostly 
affecting parts of the brain responsible for memory processes and development of anxiety (Ricaurte 
et al., 1992). Several other studies have confirmed that the level of dopamine receptor availability 
is lower than normal in drug-addicted subjects (alcoholics, cocaine abusers, crystal abusers, heroin 
abusers) (Volkow et al., 1990). Cocaine use results in long-term reduction in the dopamine 
metabolism (Karcum et al., 1990). Even a single cocaine exposure in mice led to alterations in the 
dopamine metabolism: 10 days after administration, receptors of dopamine cells were still blocked 
(Ungless et al., 2001). Studies in rats administrating amphetamine suggested a long-term dopamine 
depletion by destroying dopamine nerve fibres (Ricaurte et al., 1984), and even a single exposure 
to amphetamine seems to be sufficient to induce long-term behavioural, neurochemical, and 
neuroendocrine sensitization (Vanderschuren et al., 1999). Regarding psychedelics, ketamine is 
used in human and animal medicine as an injectable anaesthetic influencing the dopaminergic 
functions and is often used as a model for delusion and psychosis (Narendran et al., 2005). The 
dopaminergic receptor availability has been shown significantly up-regulated in chronic ketamine 
users as a compensation effect for dopamine depletion. This suggests that the repeated use of 
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ketamine for recreational purposes affects the dopaminergic transmission so that potentially less 
dopamine is available in ketamine users (Narendran et al., 2005). LSD in contrast is known to take 
effect in two phases, with the later temporal phase mediated by the dopamine receptor stimulation 
(Marona-Lewicka et al., 2005). Even a single dose of LSD increases the expression of a small set 
of genes in the part of the brain that is involved in a wide array of cellular functions reflecting the 
beginnings of long-term neuro-adaptive processes (Nichols, 2002).  
While these studies suggest that changes in the dopaminergic system are environmentally 
caused by substance use, alterations linked to personality might result from interaction of nature 
and nurture. The definition’s term for personality to be ‘biologically based’ highlights that our body 
is, to some extent, regulating our cognition, feelings and behaviour. One biological factor that has 
been postulated to influence our personality is the dopaminergic activity (Depue & Collins, 1999; 
Fischer et al., 2018).  
Respecting narcissism, a recently published study (Miles et al., 2019) has linked the two 
subtypes of narcissism (Wink, 1991) to the ‘Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory’ (Gray, 1970). 
According to this theory, personality has a biological basis connecting neural and behavioural 
processes in two brain systems: the ‘Behavioural Approach System’, which regulates the sensitivity 
to reward, i.e. in motivation, and the ‘Behavioural Inhibition System’, which regulates the sensitivity 
to punishment, i.e. in avoidance (Carver & White, 1994). According to this study, an active 
behavioural approach system and a passive behavioural avoidance system predicted grandiose 
narcissism, whereas a moderately active behavioural approach system and an active behavioural 
avoidance system predicted vulnerable narcissism (Miles et al., 2019). A strong imbalance in these 
systems, such as in narcissism, can be predicted by dopamine levels (Tomer et al., 2014). 
Psychopathy has been linked to a hyper-active dopaminergic system (Buckholtz et al., 2010) and 
two dopamine receptor genes have been proven to predict psychopathic personality traits (Wu & 
Barnes, 2013). Higher dopamine release in several brain areas in individuals with lower trait anxiety 
has been found in studies combining fMRI and PET supporting the hypodopaminergic models of 
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anxiety (Berry et al., 2019). Dopamine is furthermore assumed to play a role in the regulation of 
anxiety in healthy subjects (Laakso et al., 2003). Alterations in agency are likely to be found in other 
personality traits as well, but narcissism, low trait anxiety and psychopathy are being key ones for 
antisocial behaviour and hence legal responsibility or culpability—a rational that goes beyond the 
dopamine hypothesis. 
2.6.2 Personality, Substance Use History and Agency  
Agency is considered to be crucial for morally driven behaviour to seek meaning and to 
direct actions to reasons (Ward & Gannon, 2006). Substance use history, narcissism, low trait 
anxiety and psychopathy have been outlined as key risk factors for criminal behaviour (Bowman, 
2016; Köhler et al., 2009; Leue et al., 2004): Substance use is a predictor for offending behaviour 
(Flexon et al., 2016). Narcissism is a predictor for acceptance of violent behaviour (Blinkhorn et 
al., 2016) and offending (Blinkhorn et al., 2019), and the association between low trait anxiety, 
psychopathic traits and criminal offending have been widely investigated showing a higher number 
and greater diversity of crimes, and more violent crimes (Kosson et al., 1990). Treatment is known 
to be less successful (Ogloff et al., 1990), and it is strong predictor of criminal recidivism (Laurell 
& Dåderman, 2005).  
Substance use history has been outlined to be associated with low self-control (Flexon et 
al., 2016; Ford & Blumenstein, 2013). A longitudinal study shows that the rate of increase in 
substance use was higher among participants who had poorer self-control and lower among 
participants who had better self-control (Wills & Stoolmiller, 2002). However, the relation of 
implicit control processes such as intentional binding and substance use history remains in the dark.   
There are many long-standing statements about the relationship between narcissism and 
agency suggesting different views (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015). One study using the Libet clock 
task to measure intentional binding and the narcissistic personality inventory (NPI) to capture 
narcissistic traits stated participants with high and moderate narcissism to have stronger outcome 
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binding, whereas participants with low narcissism had reduced outcome binding (Hascalovitz & 
Obhi, 2015). The authors argued that narcissistic people perceive themselves and their actions as 
particularly important and unique, experience themselves as highly effective agents, are more 
motivated and act more dominant and show therefore stronger outcome binding (Hascalovitz & 
Obhi, 2015). On basis of that study focusing on the grandiose side of narcissism, it has been 
endorsed to look at the two subtypes of narcissism, the vulnerable type and the grandiose type, 
individually, to reveal alterations in binding (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015). It has been hypothesised 
that vulnerable narcissism could be linked to reduced agency as these individuals often experience 
symptoms of depression or low self-esteem and thus experience diminished agency (Zeigler-Hill et 
al., 2011). It should be noted, that both subtypes of narcissism can coexist, an individual can have 
vulnerable and grandiose traits at the same time (Gore & Widiger, 2016; Pincus et al., 2014; 
Ronningstam, 2009), which could have implications for intentional binding as well.  
Lower binding scores, or a reduced sense of agency, is also to be expected for trait anxiety, 
as the constructs trait anxiety and vulnerable narcissism partly overlap (J. D. Miller et al., 2011) and 
state fear decreases action binding (Christensen et al., 2019). In line with this, agoraphobia has been 
proposed to be linked to disruptions in sense of agency revealing the dynamic and relational 
structure of this condition. It was argued that in the first-person experience, individuals with phobic 
anxiety tend to mistrust their own reaction to the world. Inhibition, uncertainty and a lack of 
confidence in their bodies weakens a feeling of control shifting to a locus of control outside their 
mind and body (Gallagher & Trigg, 2016). A study investigating sense of agency in obsessive 
compulsive disorder has reported enhanced agency experience via self-report but showed imprecise 
sensory predictions on an implicit level. Thus, predictions do not serve the function of cancelling 
and filtering self-produced sensory feedback producing a constant mismatch between expected and 
actual sensory outcomes of an action; obsessive compulsive patients fail to predict and suppress 
the sensory consequences of their own actions (Gentsch et al., 2012).  
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Since trait anxiety and some aspects of psychopathy, such as fearlessness, have been found 
to be on opposite ends of a spectrum (Neumann et al., 2013), binding effects can be expected to 
mirror this relationship. While the association between psychopathic traits and criminal offending 
have been widely investigated, little is known about the underlying processes during an action, the 
feeling of control and the evaluation of the consequences. It has been reported that psychopathic 
traits are related to dysfunctions in observing and interpreting actions of others. Thus, highly 
psychopathic individuals interpreted their own actions correctly, but did not analyse adequately 
how the consequences of their actions might impact others (Brazil et al., 2011).  
Interindividual characteristics associated with variations in anxiety or arousal reactivity are 
assumed to impact sense of agency. At the same time, emotional states such as state fear 
(Christensen et al., 2019) and general arousal (Wen et al., 2015) have been reported to influence 
the sense of agency. But what role does their interaction play? Do personality traits or substance 
use history interact with emotional states in their effects on sense of agency?  
2.6.3 Personality, Substance Use History and Emotional States 
By looking at an individual’s emotion regulation in response to emotional stimuli, the gap 
between these research fields can be bridged providing a more holistic view on the sense of agency. 
Emotion regulation strategies of different personality traits could determine whether an individual’s 
feeling of control is still intact or disrupted by the emotional state. If people with narcissism, 
psychopathy and low anxiety cope differently with emotions influencing their feeling of control, 
this has implications for legal culpability according to the German law (§63 Unterbringung in einem 
psychiatrischen Krankenhaus, §64 Unterbringung in einer Entziehungsanstalt, StGB) and for 
treatment (Harkins & Beech, 2007), as sense of agency is crucial for the attribution of social and 
legal responsibility (Haggard, 2017; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore, 2016). A body of research 
has confirmed that personality traits can explain differences in emotion regulation between 
participants (John & Gross, 2004; Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001). Possibly, personality traits could 
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either work as a buffer or even suppress emotions, whereas other traits could intensify feeling a 
certain emotion (Ng & Diener, 2009). 
A recent study investigated the emotion regulation abilities in grandiose and vulnerable 
narcissism traits controlling for borderline symptoms (Di Pierro et al., 2017). Results suggested that 
narcissistic functioning includes emotion dysregulation, but such impairments were related to 
vulnerable traits rather than grandiose traits. These results are in line with previous studies reporting 
associations between vulnerable traits and emotional lability, negative affectivity, and internalizing 
symptoms and, but not between such difficulties and grandiose traits (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; 
Given-Wilson et al., 2011; J. D. Miller et al., 2013; J. D. Miller & Maples, 2011; Wright et al., 2013). 
Emotional face processing and attention is also altered in higher trait anxiety (Dennis & 
Chen, 2007). Previous research has indicated that pre-exposure to a short film eliciting anxiety 
increases sexual arousal when viewing an erotic film compared with pre-exposure to a neutral film 
(Hoon et al., 1977; Wolchik et al., 1980). Individuals with higher trait anxiety have also been 
reported to show facilitated engagement and impaired disengagement for emotional stimuli (Koster 
et al., 2006) suggesting a more intense and persistent emotional response.   
 Psychopathy, on the opposite pole of the spectrum, is suspected to have different 
underlying pattern in attention and emotional processing (Anderson et al., 2017; Groat & Shane, 
2020). For example, people scoring higher on psychopathy have shown increased task focus and 
were less impacted by stress-inducing situations than individuals with moderate to low scores 
(Baskin-Sommers et al., 2012; O'Leary et al., 2010). It has also been reported that psychopathy is 
associated with a more pronounced and sustained sensory orientation to affective stimuli (Burley 
et al., 2019; Levenston et al., 2000). An increase in pupil size for the high psychopathy participants 
for pictures of happy faces was interpreted as a lack of interpersonal trust expressing suspicion to 
smiling, thus causing arousal (Burley et al., 2019). An increase in heart rate was construed as 
attention-orienting (Levenston et al., 2000). These results support the view that individuals with 
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high psychopathy show differences in their responses to emotional stimuli, which could potentially 
explain the differences in binding as well.  
Emotion regulation is also supposed to play a crucial role in substance use. Acute drug 
intoxication serves as a regulation of the current emotional state increasing positive affect, 
ameliorating a pre-existing negative state, or decreasing craving. More generally, emotion 
dysregulation is assumed to be both cause for and consequence of drug use (Kober, 2014). 
Research has found that emotion regulation disturbances in substance disorders may result from 
impairments in prefrontal functioning, rather than from excessive reactivity to emotional stimuli 
(Wilcox et al., 2016). Emotional states do not only manifest in our cognition and behaviour 
dependent on our personality and associated emotion regulation skills, they also go along with 
changes in our physiological activity. 
2.7 Indications in Physiology 
Measuring arousal in pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate enables us to see a 
more holistic picture of our emotional response following the call for multi methods approaches 
in science. Dopaminergic activity whereas, is linked to fewer indications on a physiological level 
and is currently not accessible at all on a cognitive or behavioural level. One method that has been 
singled out to index dopaminergic activity though is spontaneous eye blink rates.  
2.7.1 Dopaminergic Activity: Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates  
Spontaneous eye blink rates are an easily accessible and non-invasive indirect marker of 
central dopamine function offering a good real time alternative to invasive and expensive 
techniques such as positron emission tomography. Amongst others, spontaneous blink rates can 
predict hypo- and hyperdopaminergic activity; with higher blink rates predicting higher 
dopaminergic function (Jongkees & Colzato, 2016). However, the relationship of dopamine and 
blink rates is more complex. When given a dopamine agonist, increased eye blink rates in 
individuals with low baseline blink rates have been noted, whereas decreased eye blink rates have 
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been seen in individuals with high baseline blink rates. This indicates that baseline eye blink rates, 
and presumably the associated dopamine level, might modulate the effect of dopamine 
manipulations on blinking (Cavanagh et al., 2014). Similar reductions in blink rates have been 
observed for sexually arousing pictures (Maffei & Angrilli, 2019), as well as for sexual interest 
(Hecker et al., 2009). Blink rates have already been used to predict reward information effects 
modulated by dopaminergic activity on intentional binding (Aarts et al., 2012). 
2.7.2 Arousal: Pupillometry, Skin Conductance and Heart Rate  
By measuring physiological arousal in pupillometry, skin conductance and heart rate in 
addition to subjective cognitive arousal via self-report, we can assess arousal via a multi-level 
approach. Collecting physiological data continuously during the task performance also adds 
information on another time level since subjectively reported arousal is mostly done in retrospect.  
The psychosensory pupil response is a dilation of the pupil through anything the activates 
the mind, often operationalised as increased arousal or mental effort (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 
2000). Particularly sexually arousing and violent materials induce stronger pupil dilation than other 
kinds of materials (e.g. content such as food, nature, neutral). It can be concluded that pupil 
diameter is primarily sensitive to events that reliably elicit measurable sympathetic nervous system 
activity, rather than being a subtle index of how much we like things (Bradley et al., 2017). Also, 
studies have reported that pupillary changes are larger when viewing emotionally arousing pictures, 
independent of the valence (Bradley et al., 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003).  
Skin conductance is an independent indicator of sympathetic activity (Boucsein et al., 2012). 
Largest skin conductance responses have been reported for emotional arousal particularly when 
viewing pictures depicting threat, violent death, and erotica (Bradley et al., 2001) and sizable 
literature has shown that skin conductance is sensitive to the presentation of sexual stimuli in 
several modalities: text, fantasy, slides and films (for a review see Rosen & Beck, 1988). 
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Although heart rate is determined by both, sympathetic and parasympathetic, it is mainly 
regulated by the parasympathetic system (Akselrod et al., 1981; Craft & Schwartz, 1995; 
Mendelowitz, 1999). Many studies have failed to show a linkage between different emotional states 
such as sexual arousal and heart rate specifically (Heiman, 1977; Laan et al., 1995), but a recently 
published study claimed a positive correlation between the three arousal measures, pupil dilation, 
larger response in skin conductance and higher heart rate in an emotional face task (Wang et al., 
2018). Combining these three arousal measures on a physiological level with self-reports on a 
cognitive level, provides the opportunity to see a more holistic view with continuous data on the 
participants emotional state. 
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3 Summary of the State of Research 
The sense of agency research is of growing research interest with important implications 
for the understanding of consciousness and motor control, clinical and neuropsychological 
diseases, and it is the basis of moral and legal responsibility in our society—which is the focus of 
this work.  
Several implicit methods have been used to measure sense of agency, the most widespread 
of which is intentional binding assessed with the Libet clock or the interval estimation task. 
Intentional binding presupposes that if an action is intentional and feels controlled by the actor, a 
binding effect can be observed in form of a subjective compression of the time interval between 
an action and its outcome. In the Libet Clock task, temporal binding is indicated by a forward shift 
in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an 
outcome toward a causal action (outcome binding). These components of intentional binding—
action and outcome binding—are driven by distinct underlying mechanisms and should therefore 
be considered separately. 
Up to this point, research has pointed out that our sense of agency adjusts in a flexible way 
to our environment, for instance in emotional states. Lower action binding has been found for the 
negative fear and anger and higher binding for unspecific general arousal. However, positive or 
ambiguous emotional states have been neglected so far, although criminal behaviour can also be 
driven by sexual desire for example. However, sense of agency does not only vary by contexts, it 
also seems to vary between people. Some individual characteristics such as grandiose narcissism, 
schizotypy and schizophrenia have been linked to alterations in binding, but more attention should 
be drawn to other aspects that are relevant for sentencing and treatment such as psychopathy, low 
trait anxiety, vulnerable narcissism and substance use history. As personality traits differ in their 
emotion regulation strategies and coping mechanisms, the extent of the influence of emotional 
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states might vary between people, so that it stands to reason to look at the interaction of personality 
traits and emotional states as well.  
In terms of an underlying rational of why sense of agency varies, the dopamine hypothesis 
has been outlined by several researchers. First evidence has been found for the role of dopamine 
in the control of voluntary action: by modulating dopamine functioning with reward and positive 
affect intentional binding was enhanced. Yet there is a lack of other operationalisations in the sense 
of agency research to test this theory. We aim to close this gap by conducting three intentional 
binding studies: first finding determinants interindividually, then inducing emotional states to 
produce changes intraindividually and finally exploring the interactive effects of interindividual 
characteristics and intraindividual responses to emotional states while controlling for arousal and 
indexing dopaminergic activity. Selection of emotional states and interindividual characteristics 
were driven by their relevance for criminal behaviour and suitability as a proxy for dopaminergic 
activity. 
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4 First Study1  
4.1 Goals and Hypotheses 
The goal of the first study was to find determinants for intentional binding in substance 
use history and personality. Previous experiences have manifested that dopaminergic drugs boost 
intentional binding under intoxication (Moore et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2011). Substance use 
history might influence the sensitivity of receptors and/or transporters of the dopaminergic system 
causing a drug-induced deficit in the dopaminergic function (Narendran et al., 2005) and lower 
availability of dopamine is associated with a weaker intentional binding (Aarts et al., 2012; Graham 
et al., 2015). Therefore, we hypothesise reduced intentional binding in substance users compared 
to non-users.  
In terms of personality factors, evidence exists for a stronger intentional binding in 
narcissists (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015). We will extend the current state of research by 
differentiating between the vulnerable and grandiose type of narcissism (Wink, 1991), expecting 
higher intentional binding in people with grandiose narcissism and reduced intentional binding in 
people with vulnerable narcissism (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015).  
4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Power analyses were run with G*Power 3.1. Previous research for narcissism and 
intentional binding has found overall binding values for high narcissism scores M = -157.40 (SD 
= 51.08) and low narcissism scores M = -100.20 (SD = 45.94) (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015). Power 
analysis for one tailed for independent t-tests with α = .05, β = .95, and Cohen’s d = 1.177 calculated 
a necessary sample size of N = 34. An experiment using ketamine as a model for psychosis reported 
 
1 The results presented in this chapter were published in advance in: Render, A. & Jansen, P. 
(2019). Dopamine and sense of agency: Determinants in personality and substance use. PLoS ONE 14(3) 
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overall binding values of placebo M = 45 (SD = 69), ketamine administration M = 72 (SD = 70) 
(Moore et al., 2011). Power analysis for independent t-tests with α = .05, β = .95, and Cohen’s d = 
.388 calculated a necessary sample size of N = 145. Although the power analysis for narcissism 
showed that only a small sample size is required, more participants were recruited with regards to 
effects for the different substances.  
In total, 210 participants were recruited for the study via flyers and social media platforms. 
Participants were informed about the purpose of the study and gave their written consent prior to 
participation. The study was conducted according to the ethical guidelines of the Helsinki 
Declaration. In accordance with conditions outlined in guidelines from the German Research 
Society (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft), seeking approval from a research ethics board 
was not required for this study: Research bearing no additional risk beyond daily activities does not 
require such approval. We communicated all considerations necessary to assess the ethical 
legitimacy of the study. We thus ensure that our research approach is in line with national and 
international human research ethics policies. 
Data were analysed de-identified. Participants gave information about their age, ranging 
from 17 to 34 years, M = 23.33 (SD = 3.52) and gender; 84 (40.0%) participants identified as male, 
126 (60.0%) as female. IQ measured by the Trail Making Test was M = 118.35 (SD = 15.97) ranging 
from 88 to 145, to ensure that both groups (substance users and controls) were demographically 
similar. The majority of the participants were students (N= 200) who studied psychology (30), 
sport sciences (99), arts and humanities (36), criminology (4), law (5), natural science (8), and other 
disciplines (18). Comparing both groups, participants with substance use history (defined as 
consume beyond cannabis) were on average three years older than controls (users’ age M = 25.01, 
SD = 3.71, controls M = 22.27, SD = 2.94, t(208) = -5.931 p < .001), and IQ was lower in 
participants with substance use history (non-users M = 120.72, SD = 15.61, users M = 114.51, SD 
= 15.87, t(197) = 2.712 p = .007). There were different gender ratios, more participants identified 
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as female in the control group (N = 129, 40 male, 89 female), whereas more participants identified 
as male in the substance use group (N = 81, 44 male, 37 female). 
4.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
4.2.2.1 Intentional Binding 
As already mentioned, intentional binding or temporal binding can be measured with 
different tasks, such as the Libet clock or the interval estimation (also interval reproduction) task.  
As the Libet Clock task has been shown to be more reliable and valid measure for binding (see 
Introduction) (Tanaka et al., 2019), we used the Libet Clock task in all three studies. 
To assess binding, the method of Haggard et al. (2002) was applied as a guiding procedure. 
The experimental design was generated by the description of Aarts and van den Bos (2011). To 
program the intentional binding task for the first and second study, a code with HTML5 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that maximises accuracy and timing precision was 
modified. It included the following features: CSS animations for presenting visual stimuli, web 
audio API for presenting auditory stimuli, and DOM event timestamps for logging user interaction 
(Garaizar et al., 2016).  
In the task, the participants watched an analogue clock, marked with numbers in intervals 
of 5 (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 55). The duration of one clock rotation was 2560ms. In each trial, the 
clock rotated twice; the events, key presses and/or tones, and participants time estimation of the 
events, occurred in the second lap of each trial. The task consisted of four different blocks, two 
baselines and two agency blocks. The order of blocks was randomised between participants (Figure 
2).  
Baseline action: The participants watched the analogue clock and pressed the space key 
whenever they wanted to in the second lap. Afterwards they reported the position of the clock 
hand at the time of pressing the key on the clock face.  
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Baseline outcome: The participants watched the analogue clock and heard a tone at a 
random time. Afterwards they reported the position of the clock hand at the time of hearing the 
tone on the clock face.  
Agency action: The participants watched the analogue clock and pressed the space key 
whenever they wanted to in the second lap. A tone followed with a delay of 250ms. Afterwards 
they reported the position of the clock hand at the time of pressing the key on the clock face. 
Agency outcome: This block is identical to agency action, but this time the participants 
reported the position of the clock hand at the time of hearing the tone on the clock face. 
In the three blocks in which the participants pressed the key, they were asked to let the 
clock rotate once before pressing the key to get adjusted to the speed of the clock (Garaizar et al., 
2016), and not to press the key at a certain time (e.g., always at the same time or only at the interval 
marks of 5). In addition, the instruction indicated that they should be as precise as possible (in 
intervals of 1) in their time estimation about the events. Each block consistent of 20 trials (Moore 
et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2 
Intentional binding task: illustration of an agency trial.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 Trail Making Test  
The Trail Making Test (ZVT, Oswald & Roth, 1987) measures cognitive processing speed. 
The test consists of four pages, where the numbers 1 to 90 are arranged in a scrambled order in a 
matrix of 9 rows and 10 columns. The participants had to connect the numbers as quickly as 
possible in the correct ascending order, measuring the total time for each page. The test duration 
was about 5 minutes. The evaluation revealed ZVT scores, which were transferred to 
corresponding IQ values. The correlation (e.g. Raven-SPM, CFT-30) ranged between r = .60 to 
.80. The test–retest reliability as well as the internal consistency of the ZVT was about .90 to .95 
(Vernon, 1993). 
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4.2.3 Questionnaires 
4.2.3.1 Demographics  
Participants reported gender, age, studies, and profession.  
4.2.3.2 Narcissism Inventory 
Narcissism is measured by the Short Version of the Narcissism Inventory (NI-20) (Daig et 
al., 2010). This version is composed of four factors: 1) threatened self, with eight subscales (helpless 
self, loss of control over affects and impulses, de-realization/depersonalization, basic potential of 
hope, worthless self, negative bodily self, social isolation, and withdrawal into feelings of harmony); 
2) classic narcissistic self, including four subscales (self-grandiosity, longing for an idealised self-
object, greed for praise and reassurance, and narcissistic furore); 3) idealistic self, with four 
subscales (self-reliance ideal, object devaluation, idealizing values, and symbiotic self-protection); 
and 4) hypochondriac self, with the subscales of hypochondriac expression of fear and narcissistic 
gain from illness. The Cronbach’s alpha was above .7. The factor structure was confirmed by an 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (Daig et al., 2010). Threatened self represents the 
vulnerable type and classic narcissistic self the grandiose type; only these two scales will be used 
for analysis.  
4.2.3.3 Substance Use History  
The items to gather information about the substance use history of the participants were 
self-generated from the AUDIT questionnaire of the addiction research network Baden-
Württemberg UKL Freiburg (Babor et al., 2001), classifying the use of alcohol. There were two 
categories: ever consumption and prior-year average consumption of alcohol, nicotine, prescription 
pharmaceuticals (painkiller, tranquilizer, medication for physiological diseases), and illegal drugs 
(cannabis, amphetamine, ecstasy, LSD, mushrooms, ketamine, cocaine). In addition, the amount, 
frequency, and years of use were registered for each substance.  
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4.2.4 Procedure  
The study took part at the University of Regensburg, and the duration was roughly 50 
minutes. Sessions started with the ZVT (Oswald & Roth, 1987), followed by the computer-based 
intentional binding task. The second part of the study included questionnaires online presented on 
the Sosci-Survey platform.  
4.2.5 Statistical Analysis 
The intentional binding paradigm included measures for binding of action (key press, bias 
in the perception of action, drift towards the tone) and binding of outcome (tone, bias in the 
perception of tone, drift towards the action) (Haggard et al., 2002). Actual time was subtracted 
from perceived time in each trial in order to determine the perception error. Action binding was 
calculated by subtracting the median error of perceived keypress time in the baseline action block 
from the median error in the agency action block (agency action – baseline action); outcome 
binding was calculated by subtracting the median error of perceived tone time in the agency 
outcome block from the median error in the baseline outcome block (baseline outcome – agency 
outcome) (Moore et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2011). To compute overall binding, action and outcome 
binding scores were summarised (action binding + outcome binding). As there was a limited 
number of trials in each block, medians rather than means were used to eliminate outliers (Pockett 
& Miller, 2007). A higher binding score refers to a smaller interval in perception between key press 
and tone, reduced binding is indicated by a smaller binding score (larger interval between key press 
and tone). 
The Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated to examine the link between intentional 
binding, personality factors and substance use. One-tailed t-tests were conducted for the highest 
(75th) versus lowest (25th) percentiles in narcissism types and different groups of substance users 
versus the control group.  
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The alpha error accumulation for the three questionnaires was calculated by using the 
formula 1 – (1-0.03)3. Thus, the alpha error was 8.73% instead of 5%. The significance level was 
corrected according to Bonferroni, and the p-value was set to p = .017 to reach significance. 
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Intentional Binding and Demographics  
Due to technical errors, data from eight participants in intentional binding could not be 
used (participants with substance use history = 3, controls = 5 missing). The mean intentional 
binding was M = 84.70 (SD = 136.41, N = 202). The mean shift in the baseline action was M = 
49.44 (SD = 95.07), mean shift in the agency action condition was M = 91.22 (SD = 117.76), mean 
shift in the baseline outcome condition was M = 58.93 (SD = 55.36), and mean shift in agency 
outcome was M = 16.01 (SD = 128.22). Action binding was M = 41.76 (SD 77.88), and outcome 
binding was M = 42.93 (SD = 118.21). No difference (in overall binding) could be observed for 
gender (male M = 81.67, SD = 142.50, female M = 86.73, SD = 132.74, t(200) = -.258 p = 797), 
age, nor IQ (table 1).  
4.3.2 Determinants of Intentional Binding 
To understand the nomological network of the intentional binding and the examined 
variables, table 1 shows all correlation coefficients to intentional binding.  
Table 1 
 Pearson correlation coefficients for determinants and intentional binding (overall). 
Variable r p 
Age (one-tailed) -.103 .073 
IQ (two-tailed) -.011 .878 
Personality (one-tailed)   
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Threatened Self (vulnerable narcissism) -.146 .020 
Hypochondriac Self -.007 .461 
Classic Narcissistic Self (grandiose narcissism) -.076 .142 
Idealistic Self  .029 .342 
Narcissism (overall) -.078 .135 
Note: Significance: p ≤ .017 
4.3.2.1 Intentional Binding and Personality  
Contrary to results previously reported in the literature, no correlation to general narcissism 
(r = -.078 p = .269) was found. But when splitting the sample into the 25th and 75th percentiles of 
the subscales threatened self (vulnerable type) and classic narcissistic self (grandiose type), the 
vulnerable type showed a weaker shift in perception of the key press if the tone followed (agency 
action trials), and consequently a weaker intentional binding (total binding), than people with low 
scores of vulnerability (table 2). Independent t-tests showed differences (t(2470)= -7.529 p < .001) 
in the means of threatened self in this study (N = 209, M = 1.920, SD = .635) compared to the 
means in the norms (N = 2262, M = 2.620, SD = 1.330), and threatened self was significantly 
smaller in the current study in comparison to mean norms (patients from Charité Clinic, Berlin). 
Table 2 
Intentional binding and threatened self.  
Subscale Mhigh SD  Mlow SD t-test  p 
Baseline action 42.95 88.36 52.70 95.41  .541 .295 
Agency action 69.26 88.93 127.77 132.15 2.629 .005 
Baseline outcome 53.23 54.21 64.61 49.54 1.125 .132 
Agency outcome 26.31 112.24 21.33 144.45 -.196 .423 
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Total binding 53.22 122.32 118.36 172.88 2.208 .015 
Note: One-tailed t-tests for intentional binding conditions, 75th (high, N = 50) versus 25th (low, N 
= 55) percentiles in the narcissism subscale threatened self. Significance p ≤ .017. 
 The grandiose type discriminated neither in binding nor in the different blocks, as presented 
in table 3. Means of grandiose narcissism in this study did not differ from and the mean norms 
(this study N = 209, M = 2.375, SD = .645, norms N = 2262, M = 2.520, SD = 1.190, t(2470) = -
1.737 p = .083) (patients from Charité Clinic, Berlin). 
Table 3 
Intentional binding and classic narcissistic self. 
Subscale Mhigh SD  Mlow SD t-test  p 
Baseline action 59.35 102.20 60.43 95.88 .055 .479 
Agency action 82.10 108.20 103.74 120.25 .933 .177 
Baseline outcome 65.50 65.68 58.99 57.84 -.526 .300 
Agency outcome 19.62 118.50 10.84 135.38 -.340 .368 
Overall binding 68.63 106.22 91.46 147.00 .867 .194 
Note: One-tailed t-tests for intentional binding conditions, 75th (high, N = 44) versus 25th (low, N 
= 56) percentiles in the narcissism subscale scores for classic narcissistic self. Significance p ≤ .017. 
4.3.2.2 Intentional Binding and Substances  
 Table 4 lists how many participants have consumed each substance (ever consumed). 
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 Table 4 
Consumed substances (ever). 
 Cannabis Ecstasy Amphetamine Mushrooms LSD Cocaine Ketamine > Cannabis 
Yes 131 63 57 44 43 49 34 81 
No 78 146 152 165 166 160 175 129 
Note: Absolute number of users.  
Table 5 focuses on frequency of use of different substances. Only the correlation for 
ketamine reached significance.  
Table 5 
Pearson correlation coefficients (one-tailed) for frequency of use and intentional binding.  
Frequency of Use r p 
All participants   
Alcohol  -.095 .140 
Nicotine   .108 .079 
Cannabis  -.056 .222 
Participants with Substance Use History 
Tranquilizers  .143 .106 
Psychotropics  .029 .400 
Cannabis  .185 .062 
Amphetamine  .168 .071 
Ecstasy  .196 .043 
LSD  .220 .027 
Mushrooms  .230 .022 
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Ketamine  .250 .014 
Cocaine  .136 .118 
Note: Significance p ≤ .017, substance use history = consumption beyond cannabis N = 78 
Regarding substance use (ever), there were several differences in binding (table 6). 
Independent t-tests showed significant differences in intentional binding for drug users who had 
consumed cannabis, ecstasy, or cocaine. Additionally, a new variable was computed by 
summarizing all users who had consumed other drugs besides cannabis (at least one additional 
substance) compared to the control group: Consumers (cannabis, ecstasy, or cocaine and new score 
substances beyond cannabis) showed significantly reduced intentional binding compared to 
controls.  
Table 6 
Differences in intentional binding (overall binding) between drug users and controls. 
Substance Musers SD Mcontrol SD  t-test  p 
Cannabis 67.51 136.31 111.29 133.13 2.227 .014 
Ecstasy 51.87 139.51 97.77 133.28 2.203  .015 
Amphetamine 60.80 141.07 92.84 134.12 1.489 .069 
Mushrooms 67.49 132.90 88.58 137.47 .898 .185 
LSD 66.29 147.33 88.63 133.63 .935 .176 
Cocaine 43.74 124.84 96.38 137.85 2.340 .010 
Ketamine 76.42 138.23 85.63 136.45 .359 .360 
> Cannabis 55.37 134.50 103.15 134.26 2.454 .008 
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Note: One-tailed t-tests for intentional binding in users versus controls for each substance. 
Significance p ≤ .017. Drug users = consumption beyond cannabis.  
Figure 3 illustrates the alterations in perception. One can conclude that participants with 
history of substance use have greater intervals of binding between action (key press) and event 
(tone), due to later perception of the time of key press and the tone (reduced overall binding).  
Figure 3 
Intentional binding of controls versus substance users. Illustrated are shifts in perception (difference = perceived time 
minus actual time) for baseline action, baseline outcome, agency action, agency outcome and overall binding. Substance 
users = consumption beyond cannabis. Interval between key press and tone is larger for substance users, i.e. overall 
binding is reduced. 
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4.4 Discussion 
We hypothesised a negative link between substance use history and intentional binding as 
substance use is assumed to go along with alteration in the dopaminergic system namely lower 
dopamine levels in the long term, attributing for a reduced intentional binding. In terms of 
personality factors, we extended the current state of research by differentiating between the 
vulnerable and grandiose type of narcissism (Wink, 1991), expecting higher intentional binding in 
individuals with grandiose narcissism and reduced intentional binding in people with vulnerable 
narcissism (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015).  
We found significant determinants for intentional binding. In terms of substances 
(consume ever): cannabis, ecstasy, cocaine and all substances beyond cannabis taken together 
corelated with reduced binding. For frequency of use, only ketamine showed a significant 
correlation with overall binding. With regards to personality, higher vulnerable narcissism was 
associated with reduced intentional binding, no effects were found for grandiose narcissism.  
4.4.1 Placement of Results in Current State of Research 
4.4.1.1 Intentional Binding and Narcissism  
Previously, a stronger intentional binding, measured with the Libet Clock task, has been 
found in narcissists (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015). In this study, we distinguished between two forms 
of narcissism, since there has been evidence that narcissism occurs in two subtypes: the vulnerable 
and the grandiose type (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2008). Dimaggio and Lysaker (2015) supposed that the 
two types of narcissists also differ in their intentional binding. According to this, the vulnerable 
subtype experiences reduced agency, particularly in self-esteem threatening situations, as it already 
unstable, e.g. when being rejected in a romantic relationship (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2011). In contrast,  
the grandiose subtype is assumed to experience hyper-agency (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015). Our 
results represented the vulnerable subtype in the factor of the threatened self, which contained, 
among others, the aspects of helpless self, worthless self, negative bodily self, and social isolation. 
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These facets embody the vulnerability–sensitivity type (Daig et al., 2010), the covert form of 
narcissism. Our results confirmed a reduced sense of agency in the 75th percentile compared to the 
25th percentile of vulnerable narcissism. Although the vulnerable narcissism mean values in this 
study were lower than the norm values, weaker intentional binding could still be observed, even on 
a non-clinical level.  
Grandiosity-exhibitionism was represented by the classic narcissistic self (Daig et al., 2010) 
in our study. The mean values for grandiose narcissism did not differ from the norm mean values 
in a clinical sample. However, no results were found for this subtype in this study. Previous findings 
have shown negative correlations between social desirability and self-reported narcissism 
questionnaires. The attempt to hide narcissistic tendencies or personality traits for reasons of social 
desirability may explain the lack of results for grandiose narcissism (P. J. Watson & Morris, 1991). 
Another explanation for the inconsistency in results across the studies could be the use of different 
questionnaires to assess narcissism. Hascalovitz and Obhi (2015) used the English version of the 
narcissistic personality inventory (NPI) (Raskin & Hall, 1979), a questionnaire for grandiose 
narcissism and found stronger binding. Our results are based on the German version of the 
Narcissism Inventory (NI-20) (Daig et al., 2010) and we did not find any effects for the grandiose 
narcissism subscales. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies investigating the 
correlation between these two narcissism questionnaires. However, it has been postulated that the 
NI covers narcissism as a broader construct including moral values, sexual behaviour, cognitive 
style and learning deficits, whereas the NPI neglects these aspects (Triller, 2003).  
4.4.1.2 Intentional Binding and Substances 
(Lifetime) Experiences with the substances cannabis, ecstasy, or cocaine but also with 
substances in general that go beyond cannabis, were significantly related to reduced intentional 
binding in our study. In the baseline conditions, the values of perception were similar, negating a 
prolonged time perception in general for substance users. However, alterations emerged in agency 
trials (key presses and tones), showing a delay in perception of the tone in substance users.  
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Most of the examined participants reported poly-substance use and variations in amount, 
frequency, and years of use, which limits the interpretation for single substances. Ideally, 
participants who have consumed only a single substance for a longer period and high frequency 
should be examined to see the effect of each substance individually, but these inclusion criteria 
would reduce the sample size immensely. Our study included some participants who reported only 
a single drug consumption, but the number of these participants was too small to generalise the 
results to specific substance. Considering that the sample was heterogeneous and not on a clinical 
level, substance use still seems to produce a robust effect in the binding mechanism. Potentially, 
results of a patient sample suffering from addictions were more distinct since the participants in 
our study have not been diagnosed with an addiction or as having difficulties in their usage habits. 
The connecting feature of the participants is likely to be lower dopamine levels; thus, our results 
indicate an involvement of dopamine for intentional binding, even on a level that does not rise to 
a clinical one.  
4.4.2 Limitations and Outlook for Following Studies 
It would be elucidating to look at components of intentional binding individually to 
understand whether and how personality factors and substance use history are related to changes 
in the feeling of control over actions and outcomes in the following studies. It has been outlined, 
that action and outcome binding are driven by distinct mechanisms (Tanaka et al., 2019), therefore, 
it could be expected that they show different pattern in personality traits or in response to 
emotional states as well. If there are differences between the components, this would change the 
implications for treatments. Other personality traits that should be taken into account are 
psychopathy and low trait anxiety as they are known to be risk factors for offending behaviour 
(Köhler et al., 2009; Kosson et al., 1990; Leue et al., 2004) stressing the importance of these 
personality traits for agency research.  
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Secondly, as counterparts of long-term changes associated with personality, short-term 
adjustments in our sense of agency should be investigated challenging its flexibility. Up to this point 
results for fear, anger (Christensen et al., 2019) and arousal (Wen et al., 2015) have been reported 
but other positive or ambiguous arousing states associated with dopamine release such as sexual 
arousal (Oei et al., 2012) have been neglected so far.  
4.4.3 Conclusion 
This study determined factors that are associated with alterations in intentional binding. 
Individuals who reported more substance use history and individuals scoring higher on vulnerable 
narcissism both showed reduced binding compared to controls. These results support the 
dopamine hypothesis, suggesting decreased binding in states associated with lower accessibility of 
dopamine. The following study can build on these findings for low dopaminergic states and clarify 
whether high dopaminergic states such as sexual arousal cause alterations in binding as well. More 
attention should also be drawn to the effects of personality and substance use history on the 
binding components separately as this remains in the dark up to this point.  
The results of the first study for narcissism and substance use history as equivalents of low 
dopaminergic activity inspired us to test states associated with high dopaminergic activity: As sexual 
arousal associated with dopamine release (Damsma et al., 1992; Giuliano & Allard, 2001; Karama 
et al., 2002; Oei et al., 2012; Ponseti et al., 2006; Rupp & Wallen, 2008; Stoléru et al., 1999), plays 
a crucial role for the evaluation of the responsibility of our actions in a legal context, we wanted to 
investigate, whether sense of agency is impacted by it temporarily.  
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5 Second Study2  
5.1 Goals and Hypotheses 
Previous research has provided evidence for an increased intentional binding in high 
arousal and neutral valence (unspecific general arousal) (Wen et al., 2015) and reduced action 
binding in high arousal and negative valence (fear and anger) (Christensen et al., 2019)—but what 
about high arousal and ambiguous or positive valence (e.g. sexual arousal)? Consistently co-
occurring with ambivalent affect (e.g. Peterson & Janssen, 2007), sexual arousal is assumed to act 
as an inhibitor of cognitive processes such as perception (Most et al., 2007) or memory (Mather & 
Sutherland, 2011). It has also been shown that experiencing lower inhibitions in sexual arousal 
affects predictions of the individual’s own judgments, decision-making processes and behaviour, 
self-control and sexual self-restraint (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Ditto et al., 2006; Skakoon-
Sparling et al., 2016; Skakoon-Sparling & Cramer, 2016), processes that are likely to share 
mechanisms with intentional binding. Sexual arousal captures attention impairing other processes 
in a similar manner as arousing states with negative valence (Most et al., 2007). We therefore 
expected sexual arousal to impair binding. 
Furthermore, as in previous studies (Christensen et al., 2016; Christensen et al., 2019), we 
expected to see alterations in action binding rather than in outcome binding. This stands to reason 
as action binding is known to be specific to conditions, where an action is internally generated and 
executed voluntarily (Borhani et al., 2017) providing a direct measure to show how close the mental 
representation of an action is linked to its outcome (Christensen et al., 2019). On the basis of the 
meta-analysis of Tanaka et al. (2019), it can be concluded that action and outcome binding are 
respectively driven by both predictive and inferential processes, but they show different pattern in 
 
2 The results presented in this chapter were published in advance in: Render, A. & Jansen, P. 
(2020). Influence of Arousal on Intentional Binding—Intact action binding, impaired outcome binding. 
Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 1-11.  
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their underlying mechanism, which is why both components should be examined separately. Action 
binding captures a specific impairment in action planning or generating an action outcome 
prediction (Tanaka et al., 2019). A highly emotional state might impair the preciseness of these 
prediction processes. From this, we expect sexual arousal to decrease action binding whilst not 
affecting outcome binding.  
5.2 Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Participants  
Following Christensen et al. (2019) we ran a power analysis with G*Power 3.1 using the a 
priori procedure for ANOVA mixed measures (repeated measures, between within interactions, 3 
groups, 2 measures, ηp = .168, α = .05; power = .95, correlation among repeated measures r = .7 
(Cohen, 1988)): a sample size of 84 was determined. The design included three groups, a sexual 
arousal group and two control groups. The second control group was recruited to examine possible 
confounding effects of the intertrial-images in the second intentional binding task in two of the 
three groups (see Design and Procedure).  
In total, 90 individuals participated in this study pseudo-randomly assigned, considering 
gender balance, to one of three groups. Analyses were conducted on de-identified data. 89 
participants gave information about their age, ranging from 18 to 29 years, M = 21.72, SD = 2.11, 
one participant chose not to answer. 39 (43.3%) participants identified as male, 51 (56.7%) as 
female, 89 participants classified themselves as heterosexually oriented, and one female participant 
reported to be bi-sexually oriented.  
Within the different groups, gender balance was given for the sexual arousal group (N = 
34, Nf = 14, Nm = 17) and neutral group with intertrial-images (N = 31, Nf = 17, Nm = 14). The 
second control group without intertrial-images was smaller and included more female than male 
participants (N = 25, Nf = 18, Nm = 7). There were no differences in age between the groups 
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(sexual arousal M = 21.82 SD = 2.11, neutral with screenshots M = 22.00 SD = 2.44, neutral 
without screenshots M = 21.24 SD = 1.61, F(2, 86) = .955 p = .389).   
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Regensburg (project code 18-1203-101), prior to commencement of any testing 
activities. Participants were informed about the purpose of the study and gave their written consent 
prior to participation.  
5.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
5.2.2.1 Intentional Binding 
Analogue to the first study, intentional binding was measured with the Libet Clock task 
(Haggard et al., 2002). Therefore, the same code provided by Garaizar et al. (2016) was modified. 
Each of the four intentional binding blocks contained 20 trials, order of blocks was randomised 
between participants. Still inter-trial images were used for the post-intentional binding task in the 
sexual arousal group and one of the control groups.   
5.2.2.2 Questionnaires 
Affective Ratings. A paper and pencil version of the SAM (Lang, 1980) was used to record 
self-experienced emotional and arousal states (figure 4). Ratings were made on a 9-point Likert 
scale for valence and general arousal (Carvalho et al., 2012). Following Philippot (1993) participants 
were instructed to report what they had actually felt in response to viewing the film clip, rather 
than what they believed they should feel, and, what they felt at the time they viewed the film clip, 
not their overall mood. Since the SAM measures general arousal and not sexual arousal specifically, 
we added one item measuring the impact of sexual arousal in the sexual arousal group (1 = not at 
all sexually arousing, 9 = very much sexually arousing).  
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Figure 4 
Adapted version of the SAM (Lang, 1980) for valence (top) and (general) arousal (bottom) ratings. 
 
 
5.2.3 Procedure and Experimental Design 
Sessions started with the SAM to assess self-reported valence and arousal, followed by the 
first computer-based intentional binding task. After completing the first part, participants watched 
a 6.5 minutes film clip either showing a sexually arousing scene (Threesome scene from the movie 
“Love”, 2015, Gaspar Noé) or a documentary film clip about the solar system/planets depending 
on the group they were assigned to. Thus, both control groups watched the same documentary 
film clip. After watching the film clip, participants completed the SAM for arousal and valence 
afterwards for the second time. Then, post-induction, the second intentional binding task was 
conducted. To ensure that sexual arousal was maintained during the second intentional binding 
task, still intertrial-images (screenshots) of the pornographic film clip were shown between the 
trials in the sexual arousal group and still intertrial-images of the documentary clip were inserted in 
one of the two control groups to guarantee comparability between the two groups. The second 
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control group did not have still intertrial-images so that confounding effects of the images in 
general on binding could be controlled for. The total duration of the study was roughly 1.5 hours. 
5.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
5.2.4.1 Manipulation Check 
Influence of inter-trial images. Two two-way mixed-ANOVAs (between factor “group”, 
within factor “time”) were used to investigate potential effects of the intertrial-images of the two 
film clips. 
Manipulation check of emotional induction. A three-way mixed ANOVA dependent 
variable SAM scores, between factor “group” (control without intertrial-images, control with 
intertrial-images and sexual arousal group), and the within factors “emotion rating” (general 
arousal, valence) and “time” (pre- and post-induction) was performed to confirm arousal 
manipulation. T-tests for paired samples adjusted with Bonferroni correction (p < .017) were used 
as post-hoc analyses for arousal ratings to examine the change over time in each group.  
Calculation of intentional binding was calculated in the same way as in the first study. Again, 
smaller values represent greater action binding as it means the key was perceived to be closer to 
the tone.  
5.2.4.2 Main Analysis 
Influence of arousal induction on binding. Analyses for influence of emotion induction on 
binding were conducted separately for each component due to the different pattern of action and 
outcome binding. Thus, two two-way mixed ANOVAs with the between factor “group” (sexual 
arousal, control with intertrial-images, control without intertrial-images) and within factor “time” 
(pre- and post-induction) were conducted for action binding and for outcome binding individually. 
Influence of arousal change on binding. In addition, (general) arousal ratings were included 
in the analyses to control for differences in arousal ratings between the groups. Therefore, the 
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differences between post- and pre-arousal ratings were calculated for each participant and 
integrated as a covariate in two two-way ANCOVAs (between factor “group” and within factor 
“time”), one for action binding and one for outcome binding respectively. A Pearson correlation 
coefficient for (general) arousal change (difference = post-arousal - pre-arousal) and action binding 
change (difference = post- action binding - pre-action binding) was used to interpret the interaction 
between action binding and arousal change. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Manipulation Check 
5.3.1.1 Control Groups: Influence of Intertrial-Images 
Intertrial-images of the neutral film clip did not influence the post-binding scores. Two 
two-way mixed ANOVAs (between factor “group”, neutral group with vs. neutral group without 
intertrial-images; within factor “time”) were conducted, confirming control groups did not differ 
from one another, neither in action, nor outcome binding between the two intentional binding 
measurements (table 7).  
Table 7 
Two two-way mixed ANOVAs with between factor “group” and within factor “time”.  
 F(1, 54) p η² 
Action Binding    
Group .195 .660 .004 
Time 
Time * Group 







Group .045 .883 .001 
Time .315 .577 .006 
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Time * Group 1.031 .315 .019 
Note: Factor “group” = neutral with intertrial-images vs. neutral without intertrial-images 
5.3.1.2 Arousal Induction: Subjective Ratings (SAM) 
The means and standard deviations for SAM pre- and post-ratings of arousal and valence 
for each group can be seen in table 8. To assess sexual arousal induced by the erotic film clip 
specifically, participants in the sexual arousal group were also asked to what extent they evaluated 
the film clip as sexually arousing (M = 5.24 SD = 1.86); four participants chose not to answer this 
question. 
Table 8 
Means and standard deviations for pre- and post-(general) arousal and valence ratings by group (N = 90). 
Group  pre post 
Control without  
Intertrial-images 
Arousal 2.96 (1.86) 3.24 (1.90)    
Valence 6.44 (1.04) 6.00 (1.58) 
Control with  
Intertrial-images 
Arousal 3.10 (1.90) 3.03 (1.97) 
Valence 5.84 (1.27) 5.94 (1.26) 
Sexual Arousal Arousal 2.26 (1.19) 4.88 (1.92) 
 Valence 5.94 (1.18) 5.71 (1.27) 
 
The three-way mixed ANOVA (between factor “group”, within factors “time” and 
“emotion rating” (arousal and valence) showed significant main effects for time and emotion rating. 
Significant interactions were observed for time * group, time * emotion rating, and time * emotion 
rating * group (table 9).  
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Table 9 
Three-way mixed ANOVA between factor “group”, within factors “time” and “emotion rating” (N = 90). 
 F(2, 87) p η²p 
Group .517 .598 .012 
Time 







Emotion Rating 220.866 .000 .717 
Emotion Rating * Group 1.966 .146 .043 
Time * Emotion Rating 







Note: Factor “group” = sexual arousal vs. neutral with inter-trial images vs. neutral without inter-
trial images. 
The three-way interaction shows a significant difference between pre- and post-rating in 
the sexual arousal group (t(33) = -9.042 p < .001, pre M = 2.26 SD = 2.29, post M = 4.88 SD = 
1.92), but no significant differences in the two control groups (control with intertrial-images t(30) 
= .168 p = .868, pre M  = 3.10 SD = 1.90, post M = 3.03 SD = 1.97, control without intertrial-
images t(24) = -.573 p = .572, pre M = 2.96 SD = 1.86, post M = 3.24 SD = 1.90). As sexual arousal 
is expected to be an ambivalent emotional state in a laboratory setting, an analogue increase of 
valence ratings was not predicted and could also not be demonstrated in our data.   
5.3.2 Main Analysis 
5.3.2.1 Action Binding: Influence of Group  
Results of the two-way mixed ANOVA (between factor “group”; within factor “time”) did 
not confirm the hypothesis, no significant effects were found (table 10). Action binding was not 
affected by sexual arousal specifically. 
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Table 10.  
Two-way mixed ANOVA between factor “group” and within factor “time” for action binding. 
 F(2, 87) p η²p 
Group .119 .888 .003 
Time .520 473 006 
Time * Group 1.635 .201 .036 
Note: Factor “group” = sexual arousal vs. neutral with inter-trial images vs. neutral without inter-
trial images. 
5.3.2.2 Action Binding: Influence of Arousal Change  
The differences between pre- to post-induction for the sexual arousal group confirmed a 
successful manipulation of sexual arousal. Nonetheless, this did not guarantee comparability of the 
three groups in arousal level in pre-induction measurements. Hence, the change from pre- to post-
arousal ratings was added to the analyses controlling for potential baseline differences independent 
of design: Post-arousal rating was subtracted from pre-arousal rating for each participant and 
included as a covariate. A two-way mixed ANCOVA between factor “group”, within factor “time” 
and covariate “arousal change” revealed an interaction between time * arousal change on action 
binding (table 11).   
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Table 11 
 Two-way mixed ANCOVA between factor “group” and within factor “time” and covariate (general) “arousal 
change” for action binding. 
 F(2, 86) p η²p 
Group .120 .887 .033 
Time .132 .717 .002 
Time * Group .766 .468 .017 
Time * Arousal Change 6.200 .015 .067 
Note: Factor “group” = sexual arousal vs. neutral with inter-trial images vs. neutral without inter-
trial images. 
A Pearson correlation coefficient was used to clarify the direction of the effect between 
arousal change as a continuous measure and action binding with differences scores (pre-action 
binding was subtracted from post-action binding; pre-arousal rating was subtracted from post-
arousal rating). These differences correlated negatively with one another (r = -.292 p = .005). 
Negative values in the arousal differences indicated a decrease in arousal from pre- to post-
induction, whereas positive values indicated an increase in arousal over time. Greater values 
represented greater action binding (key press was shifted towards tone). Hence, greater values in 
the action binding difference indicated a stronger binding in the post-induction compared to pre-
induction, whereas smaller values indicate a weaker binding post-induction compared to pre-
induction (key press was not shifted to tone). A negative correlation therefore implies that action 
binding is reduced in higher arousal and action binding is increased in lower arousal (figure 5).  
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Figure 5 
Baseline action, agency action and action binding scores visualised by median split of (general) arousal change, ↓ = 
decrease in arousal from pre- to post-task, ↑ = increase in arousal from pre- to post-task, numbers = mean perception 
error in milliseconds (perceived time – actual time), finger = actual key press, eye = perception of key press. 
 
 
5.3.2.3 Outcome Binding: Influence of Group  
The two-way mixed ANOVA (between factor “group”; within factor “time”) for outcome 
binding did not show significant effects (table 12). Outcome binding was still intact in sexually 
aroused state.  
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Table 12  
Two-way mixed ANOVA between factor “group” and within factor “time” for outcome binding. 
 F(2, 87) p η²p 
Group 1.615 .205 .036 
Time .174 .677 .002 
Time * Group .508 .604 .012 
Note: Factor “group” = sexual arousal vs. neutral with inter-trial images vs. neutral without inter-
trial images. 
5.3.2.4 Outcome Binding: Influence of Arousal Change  
Analogue to the analysis for action binding, arousal ratings were added as a covariate for 
outcome binding in order to control for potential differences in the first measurement of the 
intentional binding task between the three groups. A two-way mixed ANCOVA between factor 
“group”, within factor “time” and covariate “arousal change” over time for outcome binding did 
not reveal significant effects (table 13). Outcome binding seems to be independent of subjectively 
reported arousal level.  
Table 13 
 Two-Way mixed ANCOVA between factor “group” and within factor “time” and covariate (general) “arousal 
change” for outcome binding. 
 F(2, 86) p η²p 
Group .123 .885 .003 
Time .050 .824 .001 
Time * Group .548 .540 .013 
Time * Arousal Change .136 .713 .002 
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5.4 Discussion 
The goal of this second study was to investigate the effect of sexual arousal, as a proxy for 
a state of high dopaminergic activity, on action binding. It was postulated that sexual arousal would 
impair action binding, whereas no effects were expected for outcome binding. 
In line with the hypothesis, outcome binding was still intact in sexual arousal (interaction 
of group and time n.s.) and not affected by general arousal (interaction of time and general arousal 
change n.s.) either. Although no significant effects were found for sexual arousal specifically on 
action binding, the results of the current experiment do support the notion that generally arousing 
states are associated with a reduction in action binding as measured by the Libet clock task. This is 
in line with research which has investigated negative arousal states such as fear and anger 
(Christensen et al., 2019). However, these findings are contrary to previous results of increased 
intentional binding in general arousal measured with the interval estimation task (Wen et al., 2015). 
The cause for the inconsistency in results is unclear, however, it may be due to differences in the 
intensity of arousal experienced by participants, extent of arousal, or the use of different intentional 
binding measurements in the studies.  
5.4.1 Placement of Results in Current State of Research 
5.4.1.1 Arousal and Intentional Binding 
As stated above, the first possible explanation for the inconsistency between the results of 
our second study and the findings of Wen et al. (2015) could be that the participant’s experience 
of arousal intensity differed between the two studies. Previous research has shown that arousal can 
induce opposite effects on task performance in cognitive tasks depending on its intensity: while 
moderate arousal has benefits for other cognitive processes, high arousal has been associated with 
impairments (e.g. Peifer et al., 2014). However, the intensity levels of experienced arousal between 
the two studies cannot be compared, as different self-report measures were used.  
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Second, the arousal extent induced in the two studies could have been different. (Wen et 
al., 2015) provided arousal measurements of a second sample of participants that did not perform 
the intentional binding task. Thus, the arousal levels cannot be linked directly to the intentional 
binding scores as these values are from 10 different participants that were recruited additionally. 
These participants evaluated their arousal levels induced by the red colour of the jumping squares 
with self-report and the physiological arousal was measured via skin conductance. Their design 
assumes that the response in subjective affect and skin conductance of a small sample can be 
generalised to a larger, different sample. Although our design included subjective cognitive ratings 
only, arousal ratings of the participants were linked directly to their binding scores before and after 
the arousal induction. The differences in subjective affective ratings across the participants within 
the same emotion induction emphasise the importance of controlling for individual responses to 
the manipulation.  
A third reason for the inconsistency in results could be found in the different approaches 
of measuring intentional binding. Wen et al. (2015) used the interval estimation task, whereas this 
study was conducted with the Libet clock task (see general discussion).  
5.4.1.2 Action Binding and Dopamine 
Our results are in line with the view that action binding is more independent of temporal 
prediction than outcome binding, and that inaccurate predictions provide evidence of a specific 
impairment in action planning or generating action outcome predictions, rather than in the 
matching process of predicted and observed outcomes. As arousing states are associated with 
alterations in the dopaminergic pathways within different brain areas (Damsma et al., 1992; 
Giuliano & Allard, 2001), reduced action binding during arousal reflects the changes in the 
dopaminergic system involved in action execution (Tanaka et al., 2019). Outcome binding is less 
affected as it is driven by a different pre-activation mechanism (Waszak et al., 2012; Wolpe et al., 
2013).  
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5.4.2 Limitations and Outlook for Following Study 
This second experiment rejected effects of sexual arousal specifically on binding, which was 
contrary to the hypothesis, but it did support the notion that unspecific general arousal reduces 
binding. However, at this point, it cannot be evaluated whether arousal levels were maintained 
during the task, as the two affective ratings were only assed before each intentional binding task. 
Four affective ratings, one before and one after each intentional binding task, could clarify whether 
arousal levels were sustained during the task performance. On a physiological level, pupil dilation, 
skin conductance and heart rate could check whether the arousal manipulation during the film clip 
was successful and whether it is still present during the task performance. Since valence-dependent 
effects have not been fully understood yet, it might be useful to include an additional emotional 
state with low arousal such as calm pleasure or sadness to distinguish the effects of arousal and 
valence.  
Lastly, the next experiment could combine the previously found determinants in personality 
and emotional states. Interactional effects could reveal whether the extent of the disruption in the 
feeling of control varies through emotional responses and coping mechanisms. For instance, 
individual differences such as personality, dispositional affect, and genotype have been shown to 
substantially modulate the bases of emotion processing (Hamann & Canli, 2004). If individuals 
with higher psychopathy and lower trait anxiety scores, who are more likely to commit offenses 
(Hare et al., 2000; Knight & Guay, 2006; Porter et al., 2001), show different patterns in the feeling 
of control when aroused, this would have implications for sentencing and treatment decisions. 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
The results of our second study are in line with previous research that reported reduced 
action binding in negative arousal such as fear and anger measured with the Libet clock task 
(Christensen et al., 2019), but are in contrast with previous findings for unspecific general arousal 
in intentional binding measured with the interval estimation task (Wen et al., 2015). As effects for 
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arousal were observed for action binding only, which is thought to be more closely connected to 
the dopaminergic system than outcome binding, these results can be seen a preliminary evidence 
for the dopamine hypothesis.   
Our first two studies revealed reduced intentional binding in certain personality traits and 
emotional states. In the third study, we were interested in combining the designs of the two 
previous studies investigating the interactive effects of personality and emotional states on action 
and outcome binding individually.  
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6 Third Study3 
6.1 Goal and Hypotheses 
Besides the interactive effects of emotional states and personality traits on binding, a second 
goal of this third experiment was to gain more insight into the different effects of arousal and 
valence. Therefore, the emotional state calm pleasure with low arousal and positive valence was 
added to the design. In line with the second experiment, we expected (sexual) arousal to reduce 
action binding as other cognitive and perceptual processes have been shown to be impaired (Most 
et al., 2007; Skakoon-Sparling & Cramer, 2016). Pleasure was assumed to increase action binding 
as benefits of positive affect on cognition and perception have been reported (e.g. Chiew & Braver, 
2011). And as in the second experiment, emotion induction will have no effect on outcome binding 
as it is not thought to be linked as closely to the dopaminergic system (Tanaka et al., 2019).  
Besides vulnerable, grandiose narcissism and substance use history that were already 
examined in the first study, psychopathy and trait anxiety were added as personality variables for 
this experiment. For individuals higher on psychopathic traits, increased levels of dopamine have 
been reported, thus an increased binding would reflect this dopaminergic hyper-activity. Moreover, 
actions have been reported to be perceived correctly, whereas consequences have not been 
interpreted adequately in individuals with high psychopathy. Trait Anxiety was expected to be 
associated with lower binding scores, as this has been shown for state fear. To sum up, reduced 
binding was expected for vulnerable narcissism, substance history and trait anxiety whereas higher 
binding was expected for psychopathy. In contrast to effects for emotion induction, we expected 
changes rather in outcome binding than in action binding, as previous studies have found 
aberrations in outcome binding and overall binding for personality traits (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 
 
3 The results presented in this chapter are under review: Render, A., Eisenbarth, H., Oxner, M. & 
Jansen, P. (under review). Forbidden Temptation—The Influence of Motivational States on Sense of 
Agency, moderated by Psychopathy and Trait Anxiety. 
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2015) and we have found alterations in overall binding associated with substance use history in the 
first study as well. Overall binding and outcome binding are correlated stronger than overall binding 
and action binding (Tanaka et al., 2019).  
The interaction of emotional state and the personality traits narcissism, psychopathy and 
anxiety on binding were analysed exploratory. On a physiological level, arousal was measured in 
pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate; dopaminergic activity was indexed via blink rates.   
6.2 Materials and Methods 
This study was preregistered on Open Science Framework (OSF) at the start of data 
collection (osf.io/pskmh, anonymous link for peer review: 
https://osf.io/z7spx/?view_only=f30d881f55114285b48972996593b970). The preregistration 
adheres to the disclosure requirements of OSF. All data, materials, and code used are available on 
OSF. 
6.2.1 Participants 
A power analysis calculated with the R package ”sjstat” (Lüdecke, 2018) for linear mixed 
models with one cluster, an effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.9655 (Christensen et al., 2019) η2p=0.189 
for the state fear on action binding), power of 0.95, significance level of p = 0.05, and ICC of 0.05, 
a total sample size of 58 participants was determined. Inclusion criteria were an age ranging between 
18 and 35 years as dopamine transporters decrease with age (cut-off 40 years) (Volkow et al., 1996) 
and vision should not be corrected with glasses (causing glare issues in the eye tracker). In total 59 
individuals participated in this study and were pseudo-randomised to one of three emotion 
inductions considering gender balance. Analyses were conducted on de-identified data. Participants 
gave information about their age, ranging from 18 to 35 years, M = 23.75, SD = 4.21, and gender; 
26 participants identified as male, 31 as female, 2 as other. Within the different emotion inductions, 
gender balance was given for the sexual arousal (N = 21, Nf = 10, Nm = 11) and neutral (N = 20, 
Third Study  71 
 
Nf = 9, Nm = 10, No=1) condition. The pleasure induction differed in size and had more females 
than males (N = 18, Nf = 12, Nm = 5, No=1).   
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the School of Psychology Human Ethics 
Committee, by delegated authority of the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics 
Committee (#028117), prior to commencement of any testing activities. Participants were 
informed about the purpose of the study and gave their written consent prior to participation and 
received vouchers for their contribution. 
6.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
The experiment was run on an Acer PC with a 22-in. flat-screen monitor with 1024 × 768 
pixel resolution and a 120-Hz refresh rate. Viewing distance was maintained by a chin rest 60 cm 
from the screen. For this third experiment, the intentional binding task was programmed and run 
on MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc., 2018) to link the task to the eye tracking and labchart 
(recording skin conductance and heart rate) software. 
6.2.2.1 Intentional Binding Task 
In this third experiment each block contained 25 trials and three additional practise trials. 
Calculation of internal consistency for the intentional binding pre-induction measurement confirms 
good Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.81 for baseline action, 0.79 for baseline outcome, 0.80 for 
agency action and 0.83 for agency outcome.  
6.2.2.2 Pre-test Film Clips 
All film clips were pre-tested in an online survey using Qualtrics. Eleven participants rated 
all three film clips with the affective grid on a scale from 1 to 9 for valence and arousal. The sexually 
arousing film clip was a threesome scene from the film Love (2015) by Gaspar Noé and was rated 
M = 6.11 (SD = 2.09) in valence and M = 7.89 (SD = .93) in arousal. The pleasant film clip showed 
the opening and closing scenes of the film Pride and Prejudice (2005) by Joe Wright, a film clip 
used in other studies to induce calm but happy states ((Gabert-Quillen et al., 2015) on a scale 1 to 
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8: calmness (M = 6.3, SD = 1.9), happiness (M = 4.4 SD = 2.4), (Ramzan et al., 2016) on scale of 
1 to 5: valence close to 4, arousal close to 1.5)). In our pre-test survey, the film clip was rated M = 
7.00 (SD = 2.18) in valence and M = 4.78 (SD = 2.28) in arousal. The emotionally neutral film clip 
was naturalistic footage of a pedestrian street scene, and was rated M = 4.36 (SD = 1.57) in valence 
and M = 3.64 (SD = 3.64) in arousal. A one-way ANOVA confirmed a main effect of valence (F(2, 
26) = 4.851 p < .05 η2 = .272), post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction confirmed that the 
pleasant film clip (p = .005), but only showed a tendency for the sexually arousing film clip 
compared to the neutral film clip (p = .055). Also, a main effect of arousal was found, (F(2, 26) = 
13.62 p <.001 η2 = .512), showing higher arousal for the sexually arousing film clip (p <.001) 
compared to the pleasant and neutral film clip. The pleasant and neutral film clips did not differ 
from one another in arousal ratings (p = .182).  
6.2.2.3 Emotion Induction  
For the main experiment, participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of the three 
emotion inductions, each with one of the three film clips that were pre-tested to induce an 
emotional state. The sexually arousing film clip showed a threesome scene, the pleasant film clip 
showed scenery of nature and a calm romantic interaction, and the emotionally neutral film clip 
was a naturalistic footage of a pedestrian street scene.  
As in the second study, still images taken from the corresponding film clip were presented 
between trials for 500ms to maintain the arousal and pleasure while testing in addition to showing 
the film clips. In the second study, effects for inter-trial images did not show differences between 
two emotionally neutral inductions, with and without inter-trial images.  
6.2.2.4 Affective Grid 
The affective grid (Russell et al., 1989) consists of two dimensions valence and arousal on 
scales from 1 to 9. Participants use one cross for both axes simultaneously to describe their current 
feelings. 
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Figure 6 
 Adapted version of the Affective Grid by Russell et al. (1989) 
 
6.2.3 Questionnaires 
6.2.3.1 Substance Use History 
Questions for frequency of substance use were extracted from the validated questionnaire 
of the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (Kraus et al., 2016) as follows: 
On how many occasions (if any) have you used [insert substance]? The answer is split in two scales 
with seven possible categories (0, 1-2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-19, 20-39, 40 and more) for (a) in your lifetime, 
(b) during the last 12 months. Focus of substance were cannabis, amphetamine, methamphetamine, 
tranquilizers or sedatives, ecstasy, cocaine, LSD, ketamine, psilocybin, heroin, GHB or GBL. Sum 
scores for the number of different substances consumed in lifetime and during the last 12 months 
were calculated. 
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6.2.3.2 Narcissism 
Vulnerable narcissism was measured with the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) 
(Pincus et al., 2009). The full version contains 52 items on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all like 
me) to 6 (very much like me). Evidence for validity and reliability is given (Cronbach’s Alpha r = 
0.77) (Jakšić et al., 2014); Cronbach’s α in this sample was r = .91. The PNI was proposed as a 
measurement for both subtypes, narcissistic grandiosity (entitlement rage, exploitativeness, 
grandiose fantasy, self-sacrificing self-enhancement) and narcissistic vulnerability (contingent self-
esteem, hiding the self, devaluing). Since factor analysis indicated that only one subscale 
(exploitativeness) represents the grandiose subtype (J. D. Miller et al., 2011), we used it to assess 
the vulnerable type only (40 Items) excluding the subscale exploitativeness and grandiose fantasies 
(loads on both factors alike).  
Grandiose narcissism was assessed with the NPI-16, a short version of the NPI 40‐item 
self‐report assessment of trait narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988). The original NPI has four factors: 
Leadership/Authority, Superiority/Arrogance, Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration, and 
Entitlement/Exploitation. Reliability and validity have been confirmed in general (Kubarych et al., 
2004; Raskin & Terry, 1988) and in this sample Cronbach’s α r = .74. However, in accordance with 
(J. D. Miller et al., 2011) we only used 16 items loading on the two factors Leadership/Authority 
and Exhibitionism/Entitlement in this study. Factor analyses (Corry et al., 2008; Kubarych et al., 
2004) showed a better replicability for these factors than other factor structures based on the NPI.  
6.2.3.3 Psychopathy 
The PPI-R-40 (Eisenbarth et al., 2015), an abbreviated measure (using a genetic algorithm) 
for the PPI (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and PPI-R (154 Items) (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) was 
used to measure psychopathy. The 40 items of the PPI-R-40 load on the subscales coldheartedness, 
fearless dominance and self-centred impulsivity. Responses were given on a four-point scale (false, 
mostly false, mostly true, true). To screen for manipulative tendencies, two validity scales were 
included: virtuous responding and deviant responding (Kelley et al., 2016). The PPI-R-40 shows 
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good reliability generally and in this sample (both Cronbach’s α r = .8), demonstrates appropriate 
convergence with the full-length version (rs > .75) and the scales also show comparable criterion 
validity coefficients for measures of personality and externalizing behaviour (Eisenbarth et al., 
2015; Ruchensky et al., 2017).   
6.2.3.4 Trait Anxiety 
The State‐Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is an established, reliable, and brief self‐report 
scale for assessing state and trait anxiety in research and clinical practice (Spielberger, 1983). In this 
study, only the 20‐item trait anxiety scale was used to measure individual differences in anxiety 
proneness as a personality trait.  Responses to items required subjects to indicate how they generally 
feel by reporting how often they have experienced anxiety‐related feelings and cognitions on a 
four‐point scale with almost never, sometimes, often and almost always. Cronbach’s α in this 
sample was r = .93 
6.2.4 Physiological Measurements 
6.2.4.1 Pupillometry and Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates 
Area of the right pupil (in arbitrary units) was recorded using an EyeLink 1000-Plus desktop 
mounted eye-tracker (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, ON) using a 250-Hz sampling rate. 
Participants were tested in a dimly lit room. Two nine-point calibrations and validations of the eye 
tracker were performed at the beginning of the session. Before each trial, a manual drift check was 
performed, and if necessary, the calibration and validation were performed again. 
6.2.4.2 Skin Conductance and Heart Rate 
Skin conductance and heart rate were collected via ADInstrument bioamps and converted 
from analogue to digital signals by ADInstruments Powerlab 16/30 and then recorded in LabChart 
8.0.1. All physiological measures were collected and analysed following established guidelines, for 
skin conductance (Boucsein, 2012) and for heart rate (Jennings et al., 1981). 
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Skin conductance was recorded from the medial phalanges of the index and ring fingers 
using ADInstruments bipolar dry stainless steel GSR electrodes (MLT116F) and a ML116 AC GSR 
Amp with a sampling rate of 1 kHz. Responses were measured in micro-Siemens (µS).  
Heart rate was measured via electrocardiography (ECG) using disposable adhesive 
silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) ECG electrodes placed underneath the right collarbone and lower 
left ribcage, referenced to the left side underneath the collarbone. The ECG signal was amplified 
by ADInstruments ML138 Octal Bio Amp, sampled at 1 kHz and band-pass filtered offline 
between 1 Hz and 400 Hz. Data from two participants was excluded from heart rate analysis due 
to technical issues during recording. 
6.2.5 Procedure and Experimental Design 
The study took place at the Victoria University of Wellington; the duration was between 
1.5-2 hours. After providing informed consent, participants’ baseline heart rates and skin 
conductance were recorded, and eye tracking calibration was performed. Sessions started with a 3-
minute baseline measure of blink rates as commonly performed in other studies (Abusharha, 2017; 
Maffei & Angrilli, 2018). This was followed by the first of four mood ratings (before and after each 
intentional binding task) on the affective grid (Russell et al., 1989). After completing the first four 
intentional binding blocks (pre-emotion induction) and a second mood rating, participants took a 
short break (between 5 and 10 minutes). After the break and another eye calibration, participants 
watched one of the three film clips. After a third mood rating, they completed a second set of four 
intentional binding blocks (post-emotion induction) and fourth mood rating on the affective grid. 
Questionnaires were completed online after the computer-based tasks using the Sosci-survey 
platform. Duration for completing the questionnaires was 15-20 minutes on average.  
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6.2.6 Data Pre-processing 
6.2.6.1 Pupillometry and Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates 
Pupil data were pre-processed with the gazer package (Geller, 2019) in R. Pupil data were 
de-blinked (blinks identified, removed and interpolated during the blink period and across a longer 
segment that extends before and after the blink). Blinks were identified by the blink column with 
0s or 1s denoting absence or presence of a blink provided by EyeLink 100ms before and after the 
blink were eliminated as generally recommended. Time windows around blinks were extended with 
interpolation, starting 100-200ms before and after the blink (Nyström et al., 2016) thereby 
eliminating spurious samples caused by the closing and opening of the eyelids. Missing data from 
blinks and failure for pupil size were reconstructed by using a linear interpolation (Bradley et al., 
2008). Smoothing was done with 5-point moving average. Subtractive baseline correction was 
conducted to control for variability in overall pupil size arising from non-task related (tonic) state 
of arousal (Zekveld et al., 2018). Specifically, median pupil size during the baseline period 0 to 
100ms after each trial onset was calculated (Mathôt et al., 2018). For subjects and items whose 
amount of missing data was above the threshold of 20% (Winn et al., 2018) artefact rejection was 
performed, also spurious pupil values, so pupil values considered too small and too large were 
removed from the data (Mathôt et al., 2018; Winn et al., 2018) by visual inspection in histograms 
(Mathôt, 2018). A second pass was performed in addition to interpolation to guarantee that the 
data is not still contaminated by rapid pupil size disturbances with a median absolute deviation 
(Kret & Sjak-Shie, 2019). Lastly, data were down sampled and aggregated per trial.  
For spontaneous eye blink rate, blinks identified by EyeLink were used. Rates per minute 
within a trial were calculated. 
6.2.6.2 Change in Skin Conductance and Heart Rate 
Skin conductance was operationalized as the peak activity during each trial (maximum 
values), relative to average baseline activity measured across the 500ms prior to trial onset. Heart 
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rate was calculated by subtracting the mean of the baseline (interval 500ms prior to each trial onset) 
from the mean value of each trial. 
6.2.7 Data exclusion criteria 
Artefacts defined as values less than 40 and more than 150 for heart rate and artefacts 
ceiling effects for skin conductance (out of range) were removed. One participant reported to have 
mixed up two blocks of the intentional binding experiment, so that the corresponding action 
binding score was not used in the analysis.  
6.2.8 Statistical Analysis 
Intentional Binding was calculated the same way as in the first and second experiment. 
Again, a higher binding score refers to a smaller interval in perception between key press and tone. 
Emotion manipulation (emotion induction) was checked with mixed ANOVAs with the 
within factor “time” and the between factor “group” for the arousal and valence ratings before and 
after the film clips. For physical arousal during the film clips, mixed ANOVAs with between factor 
“film clip” and within factor “interval” for pupil dilation, skin conductance, and heart rate were 
performed. A linear mixed model predicting the subjective arousal after each binding task (post-
arousal rating) included the interaction of time * group and the main effects, pre-arousal, pupil, 
skin conductance, heart rate as fixed effects and participants as random intercept.  
To analyse effects of emotion induction on binding, two mixed linear models were 
conducted for each binding component with participant as random intercept. The first model 
included pre-affective ratings as main effects to control for differences at baseline; the second 
model additionally considered the interaction of blinks * time * group to examine dopaminergic 
activity. As number of observations on which models are fitted differ, model comparisons cannot 
be provided. 
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Six one-way ANOVAs with between subject factor “group” and within subject factor 
“participant” for age, substance use history, grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, 
psychopathy and trait anxiety were conducted to check whether groups differ in these 
characteristics. For interactive effects of personality and emotional state, four different models 
focusing on the interaction of substance use history/vulnerable narcissism/trait 
anxiety/psychopathy * time * group, and blinks * time * group were run exploratory for each 
binding component. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Manipulation Check 
6.3.1.1 Self-report: Affective Grid  
Two two-way mixed ANOVAs with within-subjects factor “time” and between-subjects 
factor “group” for subjective ratings before and after the film clip were conducted to check if 
emotion manipulation (emotion inductions) was successful. Analysis of arousal ratings displayed 
an interaction of time * group and a main effect of time (group * time F(2,112) = 6.620, p <.01 η2 
= 0.084, time F(1,112)= 28.115, p <.001η2 = 0.179,  group F(2,112) = 1.676, p = .192 η2 = 0.021) 
confirming that sexual arousal induction was successful with higher subjective arousal after 
watching the sexual arousing film clip than before, and higher post-arousal ratings compared to the 
pleasant and neutral group. For valence, a main effect of time was revealed with higher valence 
ratings after all three film clips; but no interactive effect of time and group in valence (group * time 
F(2,112) = 0.790 p = .456 η2 = 0.011, time F(1,112)= 25.816 p <.001 η2 = 0.185, group F(2,112) = 
.176 p = .838 η2 = 0.003. Thus, we did not find specific effects in valence for the pleasant film clip 
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Table 14 
Means and standard deviations for emotion ratings by film clip and time. 
 Intentional Binding Task 
Film clip Pre-film clip Post-fil clip  
  Pre-measure Post-measure Pre- measure Post-measure  
Neutral Arousal 4.60 (1.32) 4.20 (1.75)    4.40 (1.53) 3.45 (2.04)    
 Valence 5.45 (1.43) 4.75 (1.61) 5.75 (1.51) 4.55 (1.75)  
Pleasure Arousal 4.56 (1.34) 3.50 (1.57) 5.34 (1.60) 3.56 (1.74)     
 Valence 5.33 (1.56) 4.50 (1.77) 6.33 (1.76) 4.72 (1.85)  
Sexual Arousal Arousal 4.24 (1.63) 3.48 (1.87)   6.43 (1.44) 4.29 (1.50)   
 Valence 5.52 (1.68) 4.57 (2.23) 6.33 (1.39)   4.95 (1.65)  
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Figure 7 
Affective ratings on the affective grid before and after the film clip by group.  
 
6.3.1.2 Psychophysiology during Film Clips 
Psychophysiology was assessed in three equal intervals during the film clips: beginning, 
middle part and end. Three two-way mixed ANOVAs with between-subjects factor “film clip” and 
within-subjects factor “interval” for pupillometry, skin conductance and heart rate were conducted. 
6.3.1.2.1 Pupillometry 
Results for pupillometry confirmed a main effect for emotion induction with film clips 
(F(2, 56) = 93.71 p < .001 η2 = 0.743, sexually arousing M = 1440.67 SD = 641.30 , pleasant M = 
-90.91 SD = 295.86, neutral M = -343.53 SD = 400.76. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction 
confirmed that all differences were significant (all p’s < .016) showing that the sexual arousing film 
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clip caused the highest pupil dilation hence greatest arousal, followed by the pleasant film clip. For 
the main effect of interval (F(2, 112) = 20.34 p < .001 η2 = 0.006), no significant differences can 
be reported after Bonferroni correction (all p’s > .05, beginning M = 359.72 SD = 826.04, middle 
M = 464.14 SD = 969.49, end M = 281.92 SD = 1006.65)—there were no differences in level of 
arousal between the three different intervals of the film clips. The interaction between film clip * 
interval was also significant (F(4, 112) = 18.34 p < .001 η2 = 0.012).  
6.3.1.2.2 Skin Conductance 
Results for skin conductance confirmed a main effect for emotion induction (F(2, 152) = 
2.998 p = .05 η2 = 0.033, sexually arousing M = 1.80 SD = 2.40, pleasant M = 0.87 SD = 2.55, 
neutral M = 0.95 SD = 1.98). However, post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction rejected that 
differences between film clips were significant (all p’s > .12). For the main effect of interval (F(2, 
152) = 8.731 p < .001 η2 = 0.096), significant differences can be reported between the beginning 
and middle part (p  < .001), but differences between the beginning and end, and middle part and 
end were not significant (all p’s > .05, beginning M = 2.08  SD = 2.12, middle M = 0.31 SD = 2.42,  
end M = 1.33 SD = 2.19). The interaction between film clip * interval was also not significant (F(4, 
152) = 1.339 p = .26 η2 = 0.029). Skin conductance increased most during the first interval 
(beginning) in all three film clips. 
6.3.1.2.3 Heart Rate 
Main effect of emotion induction for heart rate was not significant (F(2, 167) = 0.320 p = 
.73 η2 = 0.003). For the main effect of interval (F(2, 167) = 27.54 p < .001 η2 = 0.244 ), significant 
differences can be reported between beginning and middle part (p  < .001), and beginning and end 
(p  < .001) but not between middle part and end (p = .31, beginning M = -3.89 SD = 6.78, middle 
M = 1.95 SD = 2.92, end M = 0.61 SD = 2.16). The interaction between film clip * interval was 
not significant (F(4, 167) = 0.631  p = .64 η2 = 0.011).  
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6.3.1.2.4 Self-report Arousal Model  
To evaluate if arousal levels were maintained during the task, post-affective ratings (after 
each binding task) were predicted by physiological arousal measures in a linear mixed model, with 
fixed effects for time * group, pre-arousal, pupil, skin conductance, heart rate and participant as 
random intercept. Results showed significant effects for time, pre-arousal, pupil, skin conductance, 
heart rate and interactive effects for time * group (table 15). The physiological arousal measures 
pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate during the task predicted self-rating for arousal after 
the binding task.  
Table 15 
Linear mixed model for post-arousal rating and psychophysiology measures.  
Fixed effects: Time * group, pre-arousal, pupil, skin conductance, heart rate and random intercept participant (N 
= 56). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Intercept  3.920  0.390 <.001  3.143, 4.699 
Time -1.062  0.029 <.001 -1.119, -1.005 
Pre-arousal  0.072  0.009 <.001  0.054, 0.091 
Pupil  0.000   0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.000 
Skin Conductance  0.018  0.004 <.001  0.009, 0.027 
Heart Rate -0.005  0.002  <.001 -0.009, -0.002 
Pleasure Group * Time  1.742  0.046 <.001  0.897, 1.064 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time  0.981  0.042 <.001  1.651, 1.832 
Nonsignificant     
Pleasure Group -0.771  0.549   .165 -1.866, 0.323 
Sexual Arousal Group -0.748   0.535   .168 -1.814, 0.319 
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6.3.2 Main Analysis 
6.3.2.1 Influence of Emotional States on Binding 
To analyse effects of emotion induction on binding, two mixed linear models were 
conducted for each binding component. The first model included pre-affective ratings as main 
effects only, the second model additionally considered the interaction of blinks* time *group. As 
number of observations on which models are fitted differ, model comparisons cannot be provided. 
6.3.2.1.1 Action Binding 
Both models for action binding confirmed significant effects for the pre-valence ratings 
indicating that higher valence ratings were associated with reduced binding independent of emotion 
induction. Both models also showed significant interaction effects for the sexual arousal group * 
time confirming that the sexually arousing film clip evoked a decrease in mean action binding, in 
line with our hypothesis. The pre-affect model showed a significant main effect of time (stronger 
binding after all emotion inductions independent of content) and an interaction of pleasure group 
* time (table 16). This interaction indicates that the pleasure induction lead to maintained action 
binding level. The neutral induction whereas caused an increase, which was not predicted in the 
hypotheses (table 17). The main effect of time and the interaction of pleasure group * time 
disappeared, when the interaction of blinks * time * condition was included in the model. Instead, 
the main effect of pre-arousal ratings reached significance indicating that higher pre-arousal was 
associated with lower action binding.  
Effects for blinks, time * blinks, pleasure group * blinks, time * pleasure group * blinks, 
sexual arousal group * blinks, time, sexual arousal group * blinks were significant underlining the 
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Table 16 
Linear mixed models for action binding.  
Pre-affective ratings model.  
Fixed effects: Time * group, pre-arousal, pre-valence and participants as random intercept (N = 59, number of 
observations = 11700) 
Pre-affective ratings model with blinks.  
Fixed effects: Time * group, pre-arousal, pre-valence, blinks * time * group and participants as random intercept 
(N = 59, number of observations = 11676) 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Pre-affect Pre-affect and Blinks 
Intercept  0.044    0.010  <.001  0.024, 
0.064 
 0.033    0.010   <.01  0.013, 
0.053  
Time  0.024  0.001 <.001  0.021, 
0.026 
 0.001 0.001   .314 -0.001, 
0.004 
Pre-arousal  0.001  0.000   .119   -0.000, 
0.001 
 0.002  0.000  <.001  0.002, 
0.003 
Pre-valence -0.006  0.000 <.001 -0.007, 
-0.005 
-0.005  0.000 <.001 -0.006, 
-0.004 
Pleasure Group * 
Time 
-0.016  0.001 <.001 -0.020, 
-0.013 
-0.001 0.002   .779   -0.005, 
0.004  
Sexual Arousal Group 
* Time 
-0.038  0.001 <.001 -0.042, 
-0.034 
-0.018    0.002  <.001 -0.022, 
-0.013 
Blinks     -0.000  0.000   <.01 -0.000, 
-0.000 
Time * Blinks       0.002    0.000 <.001  0.002, 
0.002  
Pleasure Group * 
Blinks 
    -0.000  0.000   <.01 -0.001, 
-0.000 
Time * Pleasure 
Group * Blinks 
    -0.001  0.000 <.001 -0.002, 
-0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group 
* Blinks 
     0.001  0.000 <.001  0.000, 
0.000  
Time * Sexual Arousal 
Group * Blinks 
    -0.002  0.000 <.001 -0.002, 
-0.002 
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Nonsignificant         
Pleasure Group 0.023  0.014    .111 -0.005, 
0.051 
0.026 0.014   .066 -0.002, 
0.053 
Sexual Arousal Group 0.021  0.014    .127   -0.006, 
0.048 




Binding means and standard deviations by group. 
 Pre-measure  Post-measure 
Group Binding M (SD) M (SD) 
Neutral action 14.50 (38.27) 36.15 (68.51) 
 outcome 94.54 (72.26) 97.56 (105.20) 
 overall 109.04 (95.63)  133.71 (115.46) 
Pleasure action 36.88 (78.76) 39.62 (49.40) 
 outcome 151.03 (83.24) 148.79 (90.86) 
 overall 213.49 (127.70) 188.40 (88.76) 
Sexual Arousal action 34.81 (51.52) 17.09 (47.66) 
outcome 94.84 (116.98) 83.44 (103.18) 
overall 129.66 (136.77) 100.52 (118.79) 
 
6.3.2.1.2 Outcome Binding 
Both models for outcome binding showed significant effects for the pre-arousal ratings, 
thus, higher arousal was associated with lower outcome binding independent of emotion induction. 
The interaction of sexual arousal group * time was significant in both models revealing that the 
sexually arousing film clip evoked a decrease in mean outcome binding, which was not predicted. 
The pre-affect model showed a significant main effect of the pleasure group which demonstrates 
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that the participants of the pleasure group had higher outcome binding independent of time of 
measurement (pre- and post- emotion induction). This effect disappeared when the interaction of 
blinks * time * condition was included in the model. In the blinks model, a main effect of time was 
observed showing stronger binding after all emotion inductions independent of content.  
Effects for blinks, time * blinks, sexual arousal group * blinks, time * sexual arousal group 
* blinks were significant, but effects of pleasure group * blinks, time * pleasure group * blinks did 
not reach significance, indicating that effects of dopaminergic activity are present in outcome 
binding but might be more pronounced in action binding (table 18). 
Table 18 
Linear mixed models for outcome binding.  
Pre-affective ratings model. 
Fixed effects: Time * group, pre-arousal, pre-valence and participants as random intercept (N = 59, number of 
observations = 11700) 
Pre-affective ratings model with blinks. 
Fixed effects: Time * group, pre-arousal, pre-valence, blinks * time * group and participants as random intercept 
(N = 59, number of observations = 11676). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Pre-affect Pre-affect and Blinks 
Intercept  0.115  0.019  <.001  0.077, 
0.154 
 0.115  0.020  <.001 0.076, 
0.154  
Time  0.002  0.001    .073 -0.000, 
0.005 
-0.005    0.002 <.01 -0.009, 
-0.002  
Pre-arousal -0.004  0.000  <.001 -0.005, -
0.003 
-0.003   0.000 <.001 -0.004, 
-0.002  
Pleasure Group  0.056  0.028  <.05  0.001, 
0.112 
 0.053   0.028   .061 -0.002, 
0.109  
Sexual Arousal 
Group * Time 
-0.050  0.002  <.05 -0.009, -
0.001 
 0.015   0.003 <.001 0.009, 
0.020  
Blinks     -0.000  0.000   <.01 -0.001, 
-0.000  
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Time * Blinks      0.001   0.000  <.001 0.000, 
0.001   
Sexual Arousal 
Group * Blinks 
     0.001   0.000 <.001 0.001, 
0.001  
Time * Sexual 
Arousal Group * 
Blinks 
    -0.002   0.000 <.001 -0.002, 
-0.001  
Nonsignificant 
Pre-valence -0.001  0.000   .205   -0.002, 
0.000 




-0.001  0.027    .970 -0.054, 
0.052 




-0.001  0.002    .585 -0.005, 
0.003 




      0.000   0.000   .103   -0.000, 
0.001  
Time * Pleasure 
Group * Blinks 
      0.003   0.000    .146   -0.000, 
0.001  
 
6.3.2.2 Personality characteristics 
Six one-way ANOVAs with between subject factor “group” and within subject factor 
“participant” for age, substance use history (lifetime), grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, 
psychopathy and trait anxiety confirmed, that the three groups only differ in age and grandiose 
narcissism but not in substance use history (lifetime), vulnerable narcissism, psychopathy and trait 
anxiety (table 19). Grandiose narcissism will therefore not be in included in analyses.  
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Table 19 
Mean, SD and group comparison for age, psychopathy score and trait anxiety score by group.  
Variable Group Group comparison 
 Sexual arousal pleasure neutral F(2,56) p 
Age  24.81(5.15)  24.06(3.23)  22.35(3.57) 3.771 <.05 
Substance Use History  14.90(3.59)  13.89(3.56) 16.10(6.08) 1.110 .337 
Grandiose Narcissism    3.48(2.79)    2.33(2.22)    4.70(3.36) 3.285 <.05 
Vulnerable Narcissism 137.33(27.93) 123.28(25.65) 125.45(21.92) 1.793 .176 
Psychopathy    89.81(11.09)   83.94(10.31)   92.35(12.76) 2.584 .085 
Trait Anxiety  46.67(11.32)  45.89(8.36)  43.80(9.40) 0.447 .642 
 
6.3.2.2.1 Effects of Personality and Substance Use History on Binding 
Only significant predictors from the emotion induction models above were included in the 
linear mixed models: Action binding models included pre-valence and pre-arousal, outcome 
binding models only pre-arousal. All models included the interaction of blinks * time * group as an 
indicator of dopaminergic activity.  
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Figure 8 
Differences scores for binding (post – pre) by binding component for personality traits and substance use history. 
Above 0 = increase in binding from pre- to post-measurement, below 0 = decrease in binding from pre- to post-
measurement. 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Interaction of Emotion Induction, Time and Substance Use History on 
Binding 
The model taking substance use history into account confirmed significant effects for 
affective ratings (pre-arousal and pre-valence) on action binding. Although no main effect of 
substance use history was found, a significant interaction of substance use history * time was 
observed showing an increase in action binding over time in individuals with more substance use 
history (figure 8). The pleasure group showed higher action binding than the other two groups in 
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both measurements. The pleasure group also showed interactive effects with time confirming 
effects of the pleasant film clip and with substance use history. The interaction of substance use 
history * pleasure group * time indicates that substance use history leads to a different reaction to 
the pleasant film clip. In contrast to the other models, the effects of sexual arousal induction 
disappeared, nor was an interaction for sexual arousal group * time * substance use history 
observed (table 20). 
The model for outcome binding confirms an influence of pre-arousal on outcome binding 
independent of time of measurement. Both emotion inductions caused significant effects 
(interaction sexual arousal group * time, pleasure group * time) and emotional inductions interacted 
with substance use history (figure 9). Blinks showed stronger effects for action binding than for 
outcome binding.  
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Figure 9 
Change in action and outcome binding between pre- and post-induction task by group (difference score, post-pre) for 
substance use history. Above 0 = increase in binding from pre- to post-measurement, below 0 = decrease in binding 
from pre- to post-measurement. 
 
 
Figure 9 displays the interactive effects of emotion inductions and substance use history 
(lifetime). Although no interactive effects for sexual arousal group * time * substance use history 
were found for action binding, significant effects were revealed for outcome binding showing that 
individuals who have consumed more substances or have reported a higher frequency of consume 
show increased outcome binding when sexually aroused. Reversed effects can be observed for 
individuals with low or no substance use history, outcome binding is decreased in sexual arousal. 
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While the pleasant film clip shows a similar, but less pronounced effect than sexual arousal for 
outcome binding, the emotional neutral film clip displays the reversed pattern: Individuals with 
little or no substance use history benefit from the neutral induction, individuals with great 
substance use history show reduced binding after watching the neutral film clip.  
Since main effects for the pleasure group and interactive effects for pleasure group * 
substance use history were found for action binding, interactive effects between pleasure group * 
time * substance use history remain difficult to interpret.  
Table 20 
Linear mixed models for action binding and outcome binding.  
Fixed effects: Time * group * substance use history, pre-valence, pre-arousal, blinks * time * group and participants 
as random intercept (N = 59, number of observations = 11676 action binding, = 11776 outcome binding). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Action Binding Model     
Intercept  0.043 0.026  .102 -0.009, 0.095 
Time -0.070 0.003 <.001 -0.077, -0.063 
Pre-arousal  0.004 0.000 <.001  0.003, 0.005 
Pre-valence -0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.004, -0.003 
Pleasure Group -0.104 0.047 <.05 -0.198, -0.011 
Pleasure Group * Time  0.109 0.006 <.001  0.097, 0.120 
Substance Use History * Time  0.004 0.000 <.001  0.004, 0.005 
Substance Use History * 
Pleasure Group  
 0.009 0.003 <.01  0.0027, 0.015 
Substance Use History * 
Pleasure Group * Time 
-0.007 0.000 <.001 -0.008, -0.007 
Blinks -0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.000 
Time * Blinks  0.002 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.002 
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Pleasure Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time 
* Blinks 
-0.002 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.002 
Nonsignificant     
Sexual Arousal Group  0.038 0.046  .421 -0.055, 0.130 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time -0.009 0.006  .177 -0.021, 0.004 
Substance Use History -0.001 0.002  .388 -0.004, 0.002 
Substance Use History * 
Sexual Arousal Group  
-0.002 0.003  .534 -0.008, 0.004 
Substance Use History * 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time 
-0.001 0.000  .126 -0.001, 0.000 
Pleasure Group * Blinks -0.000 0.000  .901   -0.000, 0.000 
Outcome Binding Model     
Intercept   0.147 0.054 <.01  0.040, 0.254 
Time  0.068 0.004 <.001  0.061, 0.076 
Pre-arousal -0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.004, -0.002 
Pleasure Group * Time -0.143 0.007 <.001 -0.157, -0.130 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time -0.186 0.007 <.001 -0.200, -0.172 
Substance Use History * Time  -0.005 0.000 <.001 -0.005, -0.004 
Substance Use History * 
Pleasure Group * Time 
 0.009 0.000 <.001  0.008, 0.010 
Substance Use History * 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time 
 0.013 0.000 <.001  0.012, 0.013 
Time * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.000 
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.000 0.000 <.05  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time 
* Blinks 
-0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.001 
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Nonsignificant     
Pleasure Group  0.114 0.097  .242 -0.078, 0.307 
Sexual Arousal Group  0.124 0.095  .199 -0.066, 0.314 
Substance Use History -0.003 0.003  .425 -0.009, 0.004 
Substance Use History * 
Pleasure Group  
-0.005 0.006  .483 -0.017, 0.008 
Substance Use History * 
Sexual Arousal Group  
-0.009 0.006  .146 -0.021, 0.003 
Blinks  0.000 0.000  .961 -0.000, 0.000 
Pleasure Group * Blinks -0.000 0.000  .805 -0.000, 0.000 
Pleasure Group * Time * 
Blinks 
 0.000 0.000  .216 -0.000, 0.001 
 
6.3.2.2.3 Interaction of Emotion Induction, Time and Vulnerable Narcissism on 
Binding 
Linear mixed models taking the interaction of emotional states * vulnerable narcissism into 
account, confirmed the effects of both emotion inductions on action and outcome binding (sexual 
arousal group * time, pleasure group * time). However, the model did not reveal the predicted main 
effect of vulnerable narcissism on action nor outcome binding. However, we found an interaction 
of time * vulnerable narcissism showing a reduction in both binding components over time (Figure 
8). Moreover, we observed significant effects in action and outcome binding for psychopathy * 
sexual arousal group * time as well as psychopathy * pleasure group * time. Both dimensions of 
the affective ratings, pre-arousal and pre-valence, had significant main effects on action binding. 
Pre-arousal was also significant for outcome binding; effects of blinks hence dopaminergic activity 
were slightly more pronounced for action binding than for outcome binding (table 21).  
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Figure 10 
 Change in action and outcome binding between pre- and post-induction task by group (difference score, post-pre) for 
vulnerable narcissism. Above 0 = increase in binding from pre- to post-measurement, below 0 = decrease in binding 
from pre- to post-measurement. 
 
Figure 10 shows a decrease in both binding components in sexual arousal for individuals 
with higher vulnerable narcissism, whereas binding seems to be intact in people with lower 
vulnerable narcissism when sexually aroused. The pleasant induction did not induce changes in 
action, independent of vulnerable narcissism and the neutral film clip led to an increase in action 
binding for participants with low scores on vulnerable narcissism, whereas participants with high 
scores in this variable did not benefit from it. Outcome binding was reduced after the pleasant film 
clip and increased after the neutral film clip for higher vulnerable narcissism, effects were reversed 
for individuals with lower vulnerable narcissism.  
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Table 21 
Linear mixed models for action binding and outcome binding.  
Fixed effects: Time * group * vulnerable narcissism, pre-valence, pre-arousal, blinks * time * group and participants 
as random intercept (N = 59, number of observations = 11676 action binding, = 11776 outcome binding). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Action Binding Model     
Intercept  0.023 0.056   .688 -0.089, 0.134 
Time  0.097 0.007 <.001  0.084, 0.110 
Pre-arousal  0.003 0.004 <.001  0.002, 0.004 
Pre-valence -0.006 0.000 <.001 -0.006, -0.005 
Pleasure Group * Time -0.076 0.009 <.001 -0.093, -0.058 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time -0.057 0.009 <.001 -0.075, -0.040 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Time -0.008 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.001 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Pleasure 
Group * Time 
 0.001 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001  
Vulnerable Narcissism * Sexual 
Arousal Group * Time 
 0.004 0.000 <.001 -0.003, -0.002 
Blinks -0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.001 
Time * Blinks  0.002 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Time * Blinks -0.002 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Nonsignificant     
Pleasure Group  0.033 0.075 .660 -0.116, 0.182 
Sexual Arousal Group  0.028 0.073 .704 -0.118, 0.173 
Vulnerable Narcissism  0.000 0.000 .808 -0.001, 0.001 
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Vulnerable Narcissism * Pleasure 
Group  
-0.000 0.001 .902 -0.001, 0.001 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Sexual 
Arousal Group  
-0.000 0.001 .817 -0.001, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Blinks -0.000 0.000 .193     -0.000, 0.000 
Outcome Binding Model     
Intercept   0.053 0.113   .639   -0.172, 0.278 
Time -0.055 0.008 <.001 -0.071, -0.039 
Pre-arousal -0.002 0.000 <.01 -0.003, -0.001 
Pleasure Group * Time  0.107 0.011 <.001  0.086, 0.129 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time  0.087 0.011 <.001  0.066, 0.109 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Time  0.000 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Pleasure 
Group * Time 
-0.001  0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.001 
Vulnerable Narcissism * Sexual 
Arousal Group * Time 
-0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.000 
Blinks -0.000 0.000 <.05 -0.000, -0.000 
Time * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Time * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.01  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.002 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Nonsignificant     
Pleasure Group  0.124 0.152 .418 -0.178, 0.425  
Sexual Arousal Group  0.149 0.148 .319 -0.146, 0.443  
Vulnerable Narcissism  0.000 0.001 .650 -0.001, 0.002  
Vulnerable Narcissism * Pleasure 
Group  
-0.001 0.001 .648 -0.003, 0.002 
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Vulnerable Narcissism * Sexual 
Arousal Group  
-0.001 0.001 .294 -0.003, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Blinks  0.000 0.000 .461   -0.000, 0.000 
 
6.3.2.2.4 Interaction of Emotion Induction, Time and Trait Anxiety on Binding 
Including trait anxiety in the analysis, the decrease in binding after the sexual arousal 
induction compared to the neutral induction disappeared. The pleasure induction however, had 
significant effects on action and outcome binding compared to the neutral emotion induction 
(interaction pleasure group * time). Pre-valence and pre-arousal influenced action binding, and only 
pre-arousal affected outcome binding. Both models rejected a hypothesised main effect of trait 
anxiety on action or outcome binding. The interaction of time * trait anxiety showed a reduction 
in action binding from pre- to post-measurement and an increase over time in outcome binding in 
individuals with higher trait anxiety (figure 8).  
With regards to blinks indicating dopaminergic activity, a main effect of blinks and 
significant interactions for time * blinks, pleasure group * time * blinks, sexual arousal group * 
blinks, sexual arousal group * time * blinks were revealed for action binding. For outcome binding 
no main effects of blinks and no interactions of pleasure group * blinks and pleasure group * blinks 
* time were observed emphasizing that dopaminergic activity can be observed more consistently 
in action binding than outcome binding (table 22).  
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Figure 11 
Change in action and outcome binding between pre- and post-induction task by group (difference score, post-pre) for 
trait anxiety. Above 0 = increase in binding from pre- to post-measurement, below 0 = decrease in binding from 
pre- to post-measurement. 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a decrease in action binding after the emotion induction for the sexually 
arousing and emotionally neutral film clips with higher trait anxiety; action binding was not 
impaired in participants with lower anxiety after the sexual arousal induction. The pleasure 
induction did not evoke differences in action binding independent of anxiety scores. In outcome 
binding, the neutral and the pleasure induction induced an increase in participants with higher trait 
anxiety and a decrease in participants with lower anxiety, whereas the sexual arousal induction 
impaired outcome binding slightly in regardless of anxiety scores.   
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Table 22 
Linear mixed models for action binding and outcome binding.  
Fixed effects: Time * group * trait anxiety, pre-valence, pre-arousal, blinks * time * group and participants as 
random intercept (N = 59, number of observations = 11676). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Action Binding Model     
Intercept  0.019 0.046   .684 -0.072, 0.110  
Time  0.122 0.005 <.001  0.111, 0.1318  
Pre-arousal  0.003 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.004  
Pre-valence -0.007 0.000 <.001 -0.008, -0.007  
Pleasure Group * Time -0.070 0.008 <.001 -0.087, -0.054  
Trait Anxiety * Time -0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.003, -0.003  
Trait Anxiety * Pleasure Group * 
Time 
 0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.002 
Blinks -0.000 0.000 <.001 -0.001, -0.000  
Time * Blinks  0.002 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.002  
Pleasure Group * Time * Blinks -0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001  
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.003, -0.003 
Nonsignificant     
Pleasure Group  0.047 0.072   .520 -0.097, 0.191  
Sexual Arousal Group -0.036 0.060   .550 -0.157, 0.084  
Sexual Arousal Group * Time -0.013 0.007   .083 -0.027, 0.002  
Trait Anxiety  0.001   0.001   .553    -0.001, 0.003  
Trait Anxiety * Pleasure Group   0.001   0.002   .732 -0.004, 0.003  
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Trait Anxiety * Sexual Arousal 
Group  
 0.001   0.001   .475 -0.002, 0.004 
Trait Anxiety * Sexual Arousal 
Group * Time 
 0.000 0.000   .067 -0.000, 0.001  
Pleasure Group * Blinks -0.000 0.000   .169     -0.000, 0.000 
Outcome Binding Model     
Intercept  0.040 0.087   .647 -0.134, 0.214 
Time -0.106 0.006 <.001 -0.118, -0.094 
Pre-arousal -0.006 0.000 <.001 -0.007, -0.005 
Pleasure Group * Time   -0.114 0.010 <.001 -0.133, -0.094 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time  0.145 0.009  <.001  0.127, 0.162 
Trait Anxiety * Time   0.002 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.003 
Trait Anxiety * Pleasure Group * 
Time 
 0.002 0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.003 
Trait Anxiety * Sexual Arousal 
Group * Time 
-0.003 0.000 <.001 -0.003, -0.002 
Time * Blinks   0.000 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Time * Blinks  0.000 0.000 <.05  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Blinks  0.001   0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Nonsignificant     
Time     
Pleasure Group  0.134 0.139   .338    -0.142, 0.410  
Sexual Arousal Group -0.062 0.116   .594 -0.292, 0.168 
Trait Anxiety  0.002 0.002   .335 -0.002, 0.006 
Trait Anxiety * Pleasure Group  -0.002 0.003   .551 -0.008, 0.004 
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6.3.2.2.5 Interaction of Emotion Induction, Time and Psychopathy on Binding 
Linear mixed models taking the interaction of emotional states * psychopathy into account, 
confirmed the effects of the sexual arousal induction on action binding (sexual arousal group * 
time) and revealed stronger effects of the pleasure induction (pleasure group * time) on outcome 
binding. However, the model did not reveal the predicted main effect of psychopathy on action 
nor outcome binding. We found an interaction of time * psychopathy for outcome binding 
showing a decrease in post-binding in individuals with higher psychopathy; no such effects were 
observed for action binding. However, we found significant effects in both binding components 
for psychopathy * sexual arousal group * time as well as psychopathy * pleasure group * time. Pre-
arousal was not significant for outcome binding when psychopathy is considered, and effects of 
blinks hence dopaminergic activity were more pronounced for action binding than for outcome 
binding (table 23).  
  
Trait Anxiety * Sexual Arousal 
Group  
 0.001 0.003   .687 -0.004, 0.006 
Blinks -0.000 0.000   .323   -0.000, 0.000 
Pleasure Group * Blinks   0.000 0.000   .377 -0.000, 0.000 
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Figure 12 
Change in action and outcome binding between pre- and post-induction task by group (difference score, post-pre) for 




Figure 12 shows increases in action binding after all emotion inductions with higher 
psychopathy scores and a decrease after the sexually arousing and pleasant film clips in participants 
with lower psychopathy scores; the emotionally neutral film clip did not induce changes in 
participants lower on psychopathy. Outcome binding showed reversed patterns for psychopathy 
scores. Higher psychopathy scores were associated with a decrease after watching the sexually 
arousing film clip, a decrease after the pleasant film clip and an increase after the emotionally neutral 
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film clip. Lower psychopathy scores were linked to an increase in outcome binding in pleasure and 
sexual arousal and a decrease after watching the emotionally neutral film clip. 
Table 23 
Linear mixed models for action binding and outcome binding. 
Fixed Effects: Time * group * psychopathy, pre-valence, pre-arousal, blinks * time * group and participants as 
random intercept (N = 59, number of observations = 11676). 
Variable Estimate SE p 95% CI 
Action Binding Model     
Intercept   0.060   0.069   .390  -0.078, 1.981 
Time -0.032   0.009 <.001 -0.050, -0.015  
Pre-arousal  0.001   0.000 <.01  0.000, 0.002  
Pre-valence -0.005   0.000   <.001 -0.006, -0.004 
Pleasure Group * Time -0.086   0.014 <.001 -0.114, -0.058 
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Time 
-0.133   0.012 <.001 -0.157, -0.109  
Psychopathy * Pleasure 
Group * Time 
 0.001   0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001  
Psychopathy * Sexual 
Arousal Group * Time 
 0.001  0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.002  
Blinks -0.000   0.000 <.001 -0.000, -0.000 
Time * Blinks  0.002   0.000 <.001  0.002, 0.002  
Pleasure Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.002   0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001  
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Blinks 
 0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001  
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Time * Blinks 
-0.002   0.000 <.001 -0.003, -0.002  
Nonsignificant   
 
 
Pleasure Group  0.020  0.107     .853 -0.194,0.234  
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Sexual Arousal Group  0.164   0.103   .115 -0.040, 0.368  
Psychopathy -0.000 0.001   .753  -0.002, 0.001 
Psychopathy * Time  0.000 0.000   .064  0.000, 0.001  
Psychopathy * Pleasure 
Group  
0.000 0.001   .980 -0.002, 0.002  
Psychopathy * Sexual 
Arousal Group  
0.001 0.001   .135    -0.004, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Blinks 0.000 0.000   .116 -0.001,0.000 
Outcome Binding Model     
Intercept   0.174   0.141   .222   -0.107, 0.454 
Time -0.068 0.009 <.001 -0.088, -0.049 
Pleasure Group * Time  0.354 0.016 <.001  0.324, 0.385 
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Time 
 0.165 0.014 <.001  0.137, 0.193 
Psychopathy * Time   0.001 0.000 <.001  0.000, 0.001 
Psychopathy * Pleasure 
Group * Time 
-0.004 0.000 <.001 -0.005, -0.004 
Psychopathy * Sexual 
Arousal Group * Time 
-0.002 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Blinks -0.000 0.000 <.05 -0.001, -0.000 
Time * Blinks  0.000 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001 
Pleasure Group * Time * 
Blinks 
-0.001 0.000 <.05  0.000, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Blinks 
 0.001 0.000 <.001  0.001, 0.001 
Sexual Arousal Group * 
Time * Blinks 
 0.001 0.000 <.001 -0.002, -0.001 
Nonsignificant     
Pre-arousal  0.000 0.000    .495    -0.001, 0.001 










In this third experiment, we addressed the gap in the sense of agency research between 
emotional states and personality traits by investigating their interactive influence on the binding 
components. Therefore, high arousing and low arousing positive states associated with dopamine 
release, specifically sexual arousal and calm pleasure, were induced. We indexed dopamine release 
via spontaneous eye blink rates, physical arousal by pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate 
and subjective emotional response by self-report of affective valence and arousal. We expected and 
confirmed reduced action binding in sexual arousal and hypothesised a facilitation effect of calm 
pleasure on action binding; which the data did not support. Results for outcome binding were less 
pronounced but still significant which was not hypothesised. Independent of emotional 
manipulation, higher vulnerable narcissism and more substance use history were expected to show 
decreased binding which was partially supported by an interaction of time and vulnerable 
narcissism. The interaction of substance use history and time indicated increased binding for both 
components. Lower trait anxiety and higher psychopathy were expected to show increased binding. 
Interaction of psychopathy and time suggested intact action binding but reduced outcome binding 
in higher psychopathy, interaction of trait anxiety and time showed the reversed pattern: reduced 
action binding, increased outcome binding. Personality traits did moderate emotional states, 
however, no main effects for personality traits nor for substance use history were found for 
Pleasure Group  0.067 0.218    .759 -0.368, 0.502 
Sexual Arousal Group -0.274 0.208    .193   -0.689, 0.141 
Psychopathy -0.001 0.151    .586 -0.004, 0.002 
Psychopathy * Pleasure 
Group  
-0.000 0.002    .929    -0.005, 0.005 
Psychopathy * Sexual 
Arousal Group  
 0.003 0.002    .204    -0.002, 0.007 
Pleasure Group * Blinks  0.000 0.000   .853 -0.000, 0.000 
Third Study  108 
 
binding. Blink data suggest that action binding is more closely connected to the dopaminergic 
system than outcome binding, in line with the hypothesis.  
6.4.1 Placement of Results in Current State of Research 
6.4.1.1 Emotional States 
We found impaired action binding in sexual arousal as predicted, increased action binding 
after the neutral emotion induction and no change in action binding after the pleasure induction, 
which was unexpected. The decrease in outcome binding after the sexual arousal induction was 
also significant but less pronounced than in action binding. Pre-affective ratings showed a main 
effect of pre-valence on action binding and of pre-arousal on outcome binding, higher scores linked 
to reduced binding, independent of emotion induction. Our results are in line with previously 
reported effects for the negative arousing states fear and anger for action binding (Christensen et 
al., 2019) and extended effects for outcome binding. Effects for unspecific general arousal showed 
an increase in intentional binding measured with the interval estimation task in previous research 
(Wen et al., 2015). However, it has to be considered that general arousal and sexual arousal might 
differ to some extent as sexual arousal has been shown to overlap with negative emotions (e.g. 
Peterson & Janssen, 2007), thus it acts as an inhibitor of cognitive processes (e.g. Most et al., 2007). 
6.4.1.2 Personality Traits and Substance Use History 
The previously found effects for personality traits on binding (Asai & Tanno, 2008; 
Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015) could not be enlarged by main effects for narcissism, psychopathy and 
trait anxiety, nor for substance use history. However, all investigated individual characteristics did 
interact with time. In terms of more reported substance use history, increased action and outcome 
binding post-emotion induction were observed. Findings for substance use history and intentional 
binding in this study are in contrast to results of related research fields such as that substance use 
has been associated with low self-control and impairments in cognitive control (Flexon et al., 2016; 
Volkow et al., 2013).  
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Although this third study indicated that narcissism interacts with time rather than having a 
main effect on binding, the direction of results seems to be in line with our predictions: there was 
a reduction in binding over time after all emotional manipulations. Dimaggio and Lysaker (2015) 
already predicted that vulnerable narcissism could be linked to reduced agency as these individuals 
often experience symptoms of depression or low self-esteem and thus experience diminished 
agency (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2011).  
Results for trait anxiety showed a reduction in action binding and an increase in outcome 
binding after the emotion manipulation. Other forms of anxiety have been claimed to suffer from 
disruptions in sense of agency caused by mistrust in their own actions (Gallagher & Trigg, 2016). 
This feeling of uncertainty about, and lack of control over their own action performance could 
enhance the awareness of the consequences. Thus, the action outcomes build up to a future threat 
which could explain the increased outcome binding. This would be in line with previous research 
showing that higher trait anxiety has lower levels of reported perceived control, especially for 
unpredictable, aversive events as they induce uncertainty about the occurrence of future threat 
(Alvarez et al., 2015). 
Intact action binding and reduced outcome binding for higher psychopathy after all 
emotion manipulations fits with previous research reporting adequate interpretation of actions but 
a bias in the interpretation of the consequences’ impact on others (Brazil et al., 2011). The 
interactions of time and personality support the view, that individual characteristics determine the 
extent of control we have over our actions and consequences—at least over time. However, as no 
main effects were found, it should be considered that the differences in personality traits and time 
might interact with the responses to emotional states rather than showing individual differences 
independent of emotional reactivity.  
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6.4.1.3 Emotional States and Personality  
In terms of interactive effects of emotional states and individual characteristics, increased 
action and outcome binding when sexually aroused, and increased outcome binding in pleasure for 
individuals who reported more substance use (lifetime) could be observed. An explanation for 
these increases might potentially be found in the link of substance use history, impulsivity and 
sensation seeking traits (Holmes et al., 2016): Sensation seeking (also novelty or arousal seeking) 
describes the tendency to seek varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences 
combined with the inclination to take risks for the sake of such experiences (Zuckerman, 2010). 
As such, these tendencies could trigger different responses to the emotional states causing the 
increase in binding after watching the film clips. 
Higher vulnerable narcissism showed reduced action and outcome binding in sexual arousal 
and reduced outcome binding in pleasure. Reduced outcome binding in a positive state indicates 
that the precondition of a rejection harming the self-esteem as proposed by Dimaggio and Lysaker 
(2015) does not even need to be met. The valence of emotional content seems to be irrelevant for 
the feeling of agency in narcissism, as it was reduced either way.    
In higher psychopathy, the feeling of control over actions was intact or even increased 
while the awareness of the consequences was reduced—the consequences were disconnected from 
the actions—when sexually aroused. Differences in motivational processing and attention in 
psychopathy, such as that individuals scoring higher on psychopathy have increased task focus and 
are less impacted by stress-inducing situations than individuals with moderate to lower scores 
(Baskin-Sommers et al., 2012; O'Leary et al., 2010), could explain the intact feeling of control over 
actions.   
Similarly, the feeling of control over actions seemed be more affected in higher trait anxiety 
than in lower trait anxiety. Previous research has indicated that pre-exposure to a short film eliciting 
anxiety produces increases in sexual arousal when viewing an erotic film compared with pre-
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exposure to a neutral film (Hoon et al., 1977; Wolchik et al., 1980). If higher trait anxiety is also 
linked to stronger responses of sexual arousal, like state anxiety is, this might explain why the feeling 
of control is reduced more. The awareness of consequences in the neutral and pleasant states was 
increased in higher trait anxiety, which could reflect an attentional bias found in previous research: 
individuals with higher trait anxiety have been reported to show facilitated engagement and 
impaired disengagement for emotional stimuli (Koster et al., 2006).  
6.4.1.4 Indications in Physiology: Arousal and Dopamine  
A strength of this study was the multilevel approach of assessing arousal in different 
modalities, on a cognitive and a physiological level. The physiological measure provided continuous 
data during the tasks for arousal, the arousal ratings are pointing more to a specific moment in 
time, before and after the task, revealing distinct effects on the binding components. From this, 
models can control for differences at baseline and during the task in different modalities between 
the participants, validating the emotion manipulation.  
The results for blinks support the idea that action binding is more closely linked to the 
dopaminergic system than outcome binding (Tanaka et al., 2019) as effects of blinks were more 
pronounced and consistent for action binding. Nevertheless, outcome binding also seemed to be 
affected by dopamine activity, which was not postulated. The fact that blinks and their interactions 
with the emotional states changed effects such as time and pre-arousal in the models underlines 
their importance for binding.    
6.4.2 Limitations  
In terms of limitations, there are two main aspects that need to be addressed. First, our 
study was not able to replicate previously reported alterations in binding for grandiose narcissism 
(Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015) as group differences were found prohibiting further analyses, nor did 
the study fully replicate the results of our first study for vulnerable narcissism and substance use 
history. As the sample for this third was rather small, we only used a lifetime score for substance 
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use history in this study and did not split the substances into different types. Thus, a larger sample 
with more substance users is necessary to evaluate the interactive effects of substance use and 
emotional states. The restriction interpretability and generalisation due to sample size also applies 
to the interactive effects of personality traits and emotional states (see general discussion).  
Second, group differences limited the interpretability of the pleasure induction for outcome 
binding, so that replication is needed to understand to what extend pleasure influences this 
component of the sense of agency. However, participants were randomly assigned to the groups 
and the pleasant film clip did cause an increase in subjective valence ratings, as such, this limitation 
does not seem to be caused by failures in the design.  
6.4.3 Conclusion 
In contrast to our second experiment, this study showed that sexual arousal impairs the 
feeling of control over actions. Our results also underline the importance of personality for the 
feeling of control in highly emotional states. For example, individuals scoring high on vulnerable 
narcissism seemed to be more vulnerable to show a reduced sense of agency in sexual arousal. 
Individuals with higher trait anxiety were also disrupted in their feeling of control over actions but 
showed an increased awareness of the consequences. In contrast, people scoring higher on 
psychopathy seemed to be more resilient to sexual arousal. At the same time, these individuals 
showed a reduction in the feeling of control over consequences which did not occur in other 
participants, indicating a moment of psychological distancing from the action outcome. The sense 
of agency appeared to be unaffected by sexual arousal in individuals who reported more substance 
use history. The results of this study suggest that individual characteristics might interact with 
emotional states causing different effects on the sense of agency. If this is the case, individual 
characteristics and circumstances should be considered more in sentencing and treatment.   
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7 General Discussion 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis attempts to get a step closer to operationalising the dopamine hypothesis in 
different non-invasive ways. In the first study, we focused on finding determinants in sense of 
agency in substance use history and personality traits (Render & Jansen, 2019). In the second study 
we induced sexual arousal and shifted the focus from overall intentional binding to the binding 
components—action and outcome binding (Render & Jansen, 2020). The third study combined 
the designs of the first two studies investigating the interactive effects of personality variables and 
emotional states. Physical arousal was assessed with pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate; 
dopaminergic activity was indexed with spontaneous eye blink rates (Render et al., under review).  
Results of the first study showed that binding is reduced in higher vulnerable narcissism 
and more reported substance use history in line with the hypotheses. No effects were found for 
grandiose narcissism (Render & Jansen, 2019). In the second study we induced sexual arousal 
predicting a reduction in action binding and no effects in outcome binding. Instead, we observed 
the predicted effects for unspecific general arousal (Render & Jansen, 2020). Findings of the third 
experiment suggested that sexual arousal impairs action and outcome binding both, with stronger 
effects for action binding. Although main effects for personality traits on binding could not be 
found, personality did interact with time and emotional states: higher vulnerable narcissism was 
associated with reductions in both binding components after emotion inductions, higher trait 
anxiety showed reduced action binding but increased awareness of the action consequences and in 
higher psychopathy action binding was intact, outcome binding was reduced—a disconnection of 
the consequences from the actions. Unexpectedly, more reported substance use history was linked 
to increased action and outcome binding when sexually aroused (Render et al., under review).  
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7.2 Measuring Intentional Binding  
Several methods have been introduced to measure intentional binding leading to different 
results. Wen et al. (2015) used the interval estimation task that measures the interval between action 
and consequence directly via reproducing the length of the interval or asking for numerical 
estimates of it. We used the Libet Clock task in all three studies, a task which captures the 
perception of event boundaries. Event boundaries are the separating elements between action and 
consequences, e. g. distinguishing the end point of the key press and the starting point of the tone. 
We can report good reliability scores for the Libet clock task (see third study, Render et al., under 
review) and in line with this, data from a meta-analysis has shown higher effect sizes for the Libet 
Clock task compared to the interval estimation task. It should be noted that the authors could not 
infer from the data whether the variance between the two tasks resulted from the differences in 
their underlying processes or merely from lower sensibility or reliability of the interval estimation 
task. However, they did question the validity of the interval estimation task to detect subtle 
sensomotoric changes in binding (Tanaka et al., 2019). This is in accordance with other researchers 
who suggested that the interval estimation task does not necessarily involve agency or intentionality 
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014): Shifts in event boundaries could theoretically occur independent of 
changes in the representation of the temporal interval separating the two events (Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2010). As the interval reproduction task shows temporal binding at much longer intervals 
than the Libet clock task (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009, 2010), it remains possible that the feeling 
of self-agency modulates the perception of these event boundaries but does not modulate the 
perception of the temporal interval itself. It has therefore been outlined that results of the interval 
reproduction are determined by the perception of a causal relationship between two events but 
neglect underlying intentionality or agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). This means, temporal 
binding in the interval estimation task might just reveal the causal relationship of two events 
independent of agency. The use of different methods to assess intentional binding might explain 
the discrepancy in results for arousal: in contrast to Wen et al. (2015) who found increased binding 
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(interval estimation task), we found reduced binding in our second and third experiment (Libet 
Clock task) (Render et al., under review; Render & Jansen, 2020).  
7.3 Emotional States: Arousal and Valence 
All of the presented studies inducing emotional states during action performance reported 
high arousal, but valence varied across the studies: Wen et al. (2015) induced unspecific general 
arousal with neutral valence; Christensen et al. (2019) induced fear and anger states that both had 
negative valence. The valence of sexual arousal, induced in our studies (Render et al., under review; 
Render & Jansen, 2020) a bit more complex. Sexual arousal is rewarding (Oei et al., 2012), however, 
it also co-occurs with ambivalent affect (e.g. Peterson & Janssen, 2007). Moreover, effects in our 
second study were associated with changes in general unspecific arousal only, which is considered 
to have a neutral valence. Previous studies focusing on the valence of the consequences (instead of 
valence during action performance) came to the result that equally arousing emotional stimuli can 
have opposite effects on sense of agency depending on their valence: studies using financial 
incentives or emotional sounds as action outcomes, revealed that negative outcomes reduced 
intentional binding relative to neutral outcomes. Yet enhancing effects of positive outcomes on 
intentional binding were neglectable relative to neutral outcomes (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; 
Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). In these studies, arousal cannot explain a valence-
dependent effect since positive and negative stimuli were rated as equally arousing. Hence, in 
contrast to the consequence’s valence (e.g. financial incentives or emotional sounds), variation in 
valence during action performance (e.g. emotional states) does not seem to change the effects on 
binding: Results for negative (fear and anger), neutral (general arousal, second study) and positive 
(sexual arousal, third study) valence in high arousal all showed reductions in binding.  The fact that 
three arousing states varying in valence have all produced a reduction in the sense of agency 
suggests that non-specific factors that accompany our emotions, such as arousal in general, 
modulate the sense of agency rather than the particular emotion itself. The only study that reported 
increased binding in arousal by Wen et al. (2015) has used a task in which the validity has been 
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questioned (Tanaka et al., 2019), and no arousal ratings of the actual participants performing the 
intentional binding task were provided, so that results are limited in their interpretability.  
However, in terms of arousal intensity, it could also be argued that arousal levels in the 
study of Wen et al. (2015) could have been of low or medium intensity since they were induced by 
red jumping squares only. Thus, low or moderate arousal could explain a facilitation effect on 
binding, whereas reductions in binding observed in our studies and by Christensen et al. (2019) 
could be caused by high arousal. Related research fields have discussed the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
assuming an inverted u-shaped relationship between arousal and other cognitive tasks in this 
context (Peifer et al., 2014) with very high and very low arousal leading to suboptimal performance. 
This shape has also been brought up for the relationship of the sense of agency and arousal 
(Herman & Tsakiris, 2020). However, consistent evidence to confirm this theory either for agency 
or for other cognitive processes is still missing. Others have argued that the relationship is more 
complex than that (Hanoch & Vitouch, 2004).  
In order to understand why the second study revealed effects of general arousal (Render & 
Jansen, 2020) and third of sexual arousal (Render et al., under review), the study designs need to 
be compared more closely. For self-reported affect, experiment two used the SAM and experiment 
three the affective grid, both scales ranging from 1 to 9. Analyses confirmed successful arousal 
manipulation with a significant increase in arousal after watching the sexual arousing film clip in 
both studies, although potentially more pronounced in the third experiment. However, valence 
ratings showed an increase in the third but not in the second experiment. Several reasons could be 
considered to explain this inconsistency: first, the selection of scenes from the sexually arousing 
film clip differed slightly between the studies. The film clip in the second study started with a short 
conversation which had been reported to be irritating by participants of the second study. Thus, 
this scene was excluded in the third study. Second, the two studies were conducted in different 
countries—Germany and New Zealand—so that cultural differences might have contributed to 
differences in reception. A review (Rowland & Uribe, 2020) investigating cross-cultural pattern 
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based on Pornhub data showed that use of porn does vary between cultures. For example, use of 
porn was higher per capita and porn users were on average older in New Zealand compared to 
Western and Central Europe. Most relevant for our results was, that threesomes were ranked in 
the top three for types of pornography in New Zealand, whereas threesomes were a less popular 
porn category in Western and Central Europe (Rowland & Uribe, 2020). As our sexual arousing 
film clip showed a threesome, this could explain why the valence was rated higher in the third study 
conducted in New Zealand than in the second study conducted in Germany. Third, as physiological 
measures (pupil dilation, skin conductance and heart rate) were only collected in the third study, it 
cannot fully be ruled out that these measures have impacted the participants’ reaction to the film 
clips.  
In terms of low arousal, our attempt to operationalise pleasure to investigate the effect of 
valence is limited in interpretation at this point. While action binding was unchanged after the 
pleasure manipulation, rejecting the predicted facilitation effect, a main effect of the pleasure group 
in one of the outcome binding models was observed. Absolute values showed that outcome 
binding was already higher in the pleasure group than in the other groups in the first intentional 
binding measurement. In addition, subjective ratings did not confirm specific effects for the 
pleasure induction. Instead, increased valence ratings were observed in all three groups which limits 
the interpretability for the results of calm pleasure specifically.  
Hence, the question whether arousal or valence determine the direction of effects on 
binding cannot fully be answered at this point. Including a state of high arousal and purely positive 
valence or a state of low arousal and negative valence, could potentially clarify, what role valence 
plays in high arousing states. However, since pre-affect was included in the analysis of the third 
study, we have preliminary evidence suggesting that outcome binding is more affected by arousal 
than valence, whereas action binding is influenced by both affect dimensions, valence and arousal. 
Why only action binding is affected by valence needs further investigation before concrete 
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assumptions about reasons can be made. However, action binding does seem to be more vulnerable 
to environmental changes than outcome binding. 
By including both components in the analyses leading to different results, we were able to 
present evidence that action and outcome binding are likely to be driven by different underlying 
processes (Tanaka et al., 2019). Hence, our design offers an insight into the direct effects of an 
emotional state during action performance on action binding and outcome binding separately for 
the first time. While many studies have focused on manipulating the action outcome to investigate 
how much each component is affected by it, no study has investigated action and outcome binding 
in the effects of emotional states during action performance before. The awareness of 
consequences measured with outcome binding, although, is equally important for legal and social 
responsibility than feeling of control over action (action binding). 
7.4 Personality and Substance Use History 
Another relevant factor for criminal behaviour is a history of substance use (Flexon et al., 
2016). Previous research has reported increased intentional binding in ketamine administration 
(Moore et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2013) and a binding boost in the Parkinson medication L-Dopa 
(Moore et al., 2010). In our first study (Render & Jansen, 2019), we investigated whether alterations 
in binding are also linked to substance use history beyond cannabis, particularly to the substances 
cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine. Results showed reduced intentional binding compared to controls 
without substance use history, which could indicate a lower accessibility of dopamine decreasing 
binding. Results of our third study (Render et al., under review) in contrast, do not confirm such a 
main effect of substance use history (as a sum score for lifetime, not split into subtypes) on binding, 
although an interaction of time and substance use history was observed. Interestingly, both binding 
components were increased after watching either of the three film clips. As participants in this 
study reported rather little substance use history, it remains possible that an occasional, more 
limited consume has different effects on agency than more frequent consume or early consume 
onset (Urban et al., 2012). Potentially levels of dopamine are not as affected as by higher consume. 
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Another potential explanation could be found in sensation seeking personality traits that have been 
reported to correlate with substance use (Holmes et al., 2016), however, these results are contrary 
to previous research of related fields (Volkow et al., 2013). When comparing the results of the two 
studies, results of our third study seem to be in contrast to what we found in first study and to 
results of related research fields, e.g. substance use has been associated with low self-control and 
impairments in cognitive control (Flexon et al., 2016; Volkow et al., 2013). It should be considered 
that the sample size of 60 participants in the third study limited the examination of single 
substances, thus we decided to define substance use as a continuous variable throughout lifetime 
for analyses. In contrast to that, our first study consisted of 210 participants so that we were able 
to divide the substances into different categories for analyses. This might have contributed to the 
differences between the two studies.  
In terms of personality traits in general, no main effects on binding were found consistently 
across both studies (Render et al., under review; Render & Jansen, 2019). Higher vulnerable 
narcissism was associated with reduced binding in the first study (Render & Jansen, 2019), but this 
main effect was not replicated in the third study (Render et al., under review). However, as with 
substance use history, vulnerable narcissism did interact with time in the third study: binding was 
reduced after all three emotion inductions in higher vulnerable narcissism (Render et al., under 
review). Reduced agency in vulnerable narcissism has been predicted by other researchers 
(Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015) as these individuals often experience symptoms of depression or low 
self-esteem and thus diminished agency (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2011). This rational is also found in the 
‘Perceived Control Theory of Narcissism’ (Hansen-Brown, 2018): vulnerable narcissists have the 
feeling that the world is happening to them instead of them identifying as causal agents. They 
perceive low control over their own outcomes, the behaviour of others, and the world around them 
which makes them ambitious to protect themselves from negative outcomes. By doing so, they 
neglect pursuing positive outcomes showing a lack of intentionality. Grandiose narcissists whereas, 
perceive high control over these domains. This narcissist subtype pursues their desires, craves for 
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influence over others by exploiting them for personal gain and maintaining power in relationships 
(Hansen-Brown, 2018). While a previous study has confirmed this theory with increased binding 
in grandiose narcissism (Hascalovitz & Obhi, 2015), we were not able to replicate these results: 
analyses of our first study rejected such effects (Render & Jansen, 2019), and analyses of our third 
study could not be performed because group differences limited the comparability of the three 
conditions (Render et al., under review). It remains unclear whether the lack of effects was sample 
related, e.g. low scores of grandiose narcissism in the first sample, method-dependent, e.g. because 
of different questionnaires that were used, or due to independence of the two constructs. 
Effects of trait anxiety and psychopathy were examined in the third study (Render et al., 
under review). The interaction of trait anxiety and time indicated reversed patterns for the binding 
components: for higher trait anxiety action binding was reduced; outcome binding was increased 
after all film clips. The disruption of the feeling of control over actions (action binding) could be 
due to mistrust in the own actions (Gallagher & Trigg, 2016). Anxiety is moreover assumed to 
involve a tendency to focus on the uncertainty of the future outcomes (Floyd et al., 2005) which 
could explain the increase in outcome binding. Effects for higher psychopathy on the other hand, 
indicated that action binding remained intact in all emotional states, but outcome binding was 
reduced. Other agency studies resonate with our results, finding adequate interpretation of actions 
but a bias in the interpretation of the consequences’ impact on others (Brazil et al., 2011). 
To sum up, we have not consistently found main effects of the investigated personality 
traits on binding in our studies (Render et al., under review; Render & Jansen, 2019). Our findings 
suggest that these personality traits interact with time and emotional states, affecting the feeling of 
control in different ways (Render et al., under review). However, it should be considered that 
personality traits were measured via self-report, thus reflecting certain parts of the personality 
constructs only, which could have affected the results. The interactions of emotional states with 
personality traits and substance use history propose that reductions and increases in sense of agency 
could be function of emotion regulation strategies differing interindividually. 
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7.5 Substance Use History, Personality and Emotional States  
The extent to which agency was impacted by sexual arousal appears to be dependent on 
individual characteristics in such a way as to form three patterns: fully disrupted (higher vulnerable 
narcissism and higher trait anxiety), partially disrupted (lower trait anxiety and higher psychopathy) 
and not affected at all (more reported substance use history) (Render et al., under review).  
Higher vulnerable narcissism and higher trait anxiety were associated with reduced feeling 
of control over actions and consequences when sexually aroused in our third study (Render et al., 
under review). In narcissism, the lack of control in aroused state might result from maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies that have been found in vulnerable narcissism, such as nonacceptance 
of one’s own emotional responses, impulse control difficulties, limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies, and a lack of emotional clarity (Zhang et al., 2015). This way, vulnerable narcissists are 
experiencing negative affect and anxiety (Tracy et al., 2011) emphasising the overlap with trait 
anxiety. For higher trait anxiety, previous research supports the idea of lower levels of reported 
perceived control, especially for unpredictable, aversive events because these induce uncertainty 
about the occurrence of future threat. Hence, perceived control mediates the relationship between 
high-trait anxiety and exaggerated neural processing of emotionally significant events (Alvarez et 
al., 2015). When manipulating the level of perceived control over arousal, rather than examining 
perceived control as an outcome, higher anxiety sensitivity showed greater emotional responding 
in low control over arousal (Telch et al., 1996).   
Individuals with lower trait anxiety, higher psychopathy and more reported substance use 
history seem to be less vulnerable to the sexual arousal induction. More reported substance use 
history was linked to an increased feeling of control over actions and consequences in sexual arousal 
(Render et al., under review). This result was unexpected because previous findings indicated the 
opposite,  low self-control (Flexon et al., 2016) and dysfunctional emotion regulation and arousal 
reactivity (Kober, 2014; Poon et al., 2016). Substance use is found more often in certain personality 
traits such as sensation seeking (Holmes et al., 2016). Thus, it cannot be ruled out, that underlying 
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personality traits have moderated the effects of substance use history and emotional states on 
binding. In terms of higher psychopathy and lower trait anxiety, our results suggest that higher 
psychopathy has an intact feeling of control over actions but a reduction in the feeling of control 
over consequences (Render et al., under review). Research has shown that psychopathic traits such 
as higher impulsivity are linked to greater reactivity to stimulation initially, but, arousal response 
also declines faster in sustained exposure, measured on a physiological level (Mathias & Stanford, 
2003). A fast decline or habituation effect in sexual arousal could explain why the feeling of control 
over actions is not disrupted in higher psychopathy. In compliance with that, other findings suggest 
that psychopathy traits can contribute to rational decision making in socially difficult situations 
(Osumi & Ohira, 2010). At the same time, the link of actions and action outcomes seems to be 
disrupted which implies that a feeling of responsibility for action outcomes might not be present.  
A partially functional sense of agency in higher psychopathy and lower trait anxiety does 
have implications for legal culpability. Previous research has postulated that psychopathy has 
alterations in agency that do not compare to normally functioning individuals (Fox et al., 2013). 
We specified this assumption showing that a disconnection of actions and consequences occurs in 
higher psychopathy (Render et al., under review). However, this does not imply that psychopathy 
is devoid of all agency in terms of how adult human agency is defined by law. While limitations in 
moral understanding, emotional processing and agency make it difficult to justify full responsibility 
and punishment, harmful acts should not happen without restraint, even if individuals with 
psychopathy are found to be not or only partially criminally responsible (Fox et al., 2013). Instead 
of seeking a purely punitive solution such as a prison sentence, it should be considered whether 
treatment options might improve the awareness of harmful consequences as our results indicate 
that this process is diminished in psychopathy.  
The fact that the extent to which the feeling of control is affected by emotional states is 
determined by personality traits highlights that the individual characteristics need to be taken into 
account when evaluating levels of responsibility. Why these inter- and intraindividual difference in 
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sense of agency occur, is not yet fully understood. Potentially, these differences could also be driven 
by alterations in the dopaminergic system. 
7.6 Dopamine Hypothesis 
Previous researchers have already highlighted dopamine as a determinant of intentional 
binding (Aarts et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2015; Moore et al., 2010), some have suggested that 
dopamine particularly determines action binding (Moore et al., 2010; Saito et al., 2015). 
Administration of testosterone (van der Westhuizen et al., 2017) for example increased action 
binding but not outcome binding in women and the authors suggested that this stemmed from a 
dopamine release caused by the testosterone induction. As strong motor predictions themselves 
can lead to binding, the authors speculated whether testosterone and/or dopamine change the 
perceived predictability of actions as an overly strong trust in the reliability of the own predictions 
via a positive mood (van der Westhuizen et al., 2017). Arousing states are associated with alterations 
in the dopaminergic pathways within different brain areas (Damsma et al., 1992; Giuliano & Allard, 
2001), therefore, alterations in binding during arousal reflect the changes in the dopaminergic 
system involved in action execution (Tanaka et al., 2019). Reduced action binding, which was 
observed in both studies (two and three) (Render et al., under review; Render & Jansen, 2020), 
could result from a specific impairment in action planning or generating action outcome 
predictions (inaccurate predictions). In line with that view, we observed that results for blink rates, 
as an indicator for dopaminergic activity, and sexual arousal, a proxy for a high dopaminergic state, 
were more pronounced for action binding than for outcome binding (Render et al., under review). 
However, effects of sexual arousal and blink rates were also found for outcome binding in the third 
study, suggesting that outcome binding is not fully independent of the dopaminergic system. Of 
what shape the relationship between intentional binding and dopamine is, remains unclear at this 
stage. A linear link seems unlikely as binding was reduced in states that were used as a proxy for 
low (Render & Jansen, 2019) and high (Render et al., under review; Render & Jansen, 2020) 
dopaminergic activity. Another possibility could be an inverted u-function, which has been 
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suggested for dopamine and other cognitive abilities such as cognitive control (Cools & 
D'Esposito, 2011), but potentially the relationship is more complex than that. Although we cannot 
define how dopamine and sense of agency interact precisely at this point, we have provided 
evidence that dopamine is more important for action binding and that the relationship between 
dopamine and sense of agency cannot be linear. However, the partial support for the dopamine 
hypothesis provided by this work could also be considered a limitation.  
7.7 Limitations  
In terms of other limitations, the first aspect that needs to be noted is that the increase of 
binding after the emotionally neutral film clip in the second (Render & Jansen, 2020) and the third 
experiment (Render et al., under review) is not yet fully understood. As two different film clips 
were used (the second of which was also pre-tested in an online survey to ensure neutrality), it 
seems unlikely that the film clips themselves were perceived better or worse. Another possibility is 
a learning effect, e.g. binding would have been higher without the neutral film clip exposure as well, 
as it results from experience gained in the first task. Comparing the groups with different 
emotionally neutral treatments, such as just taking a break without watching a film clip, might help 
to clarify this effect. However, it remains difficult to evaluate what exactly caused this effect since, 
to the best of our knowledge, no studies have reported long-term retest-reliability (days, weeks or 
months) of the intentional binding measures yet. Cronbach’s alpha values in the third experiment, 
however, did indicate good internal consistency of our task (Render et al., under review). 
A second point of critique are the limited sample sizes (first study N=210 (Render & 
Jansen, 2019), second study N = 90 (Render & Jansen, 2020), third study N = 60 (Render et al., 
under review)) that the results are based on currently, restricting the interpretability and 
generalisability. To evaluate whether effects remain and how strong the effects are, the studies need 
to be replicated with more participants. As the participants have mostly been students, it would be 
elucidating to run this experiment in an offender sample to see if results change when studying 
participants that have higher scores of psychopathy for example. Particularly offender populations 
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are considered as highly psychopathy populations: whilst the prevalence of psychopathy in the 
general population is relatively low (0.3–2%), it is much higher among general offender populations 
(15-25%) (Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2007; Patrick & Drislane, 2015). Nonetheless, we were able to 
observe the alterations in binding even on a non-clinical level, which means that our results may 
apply to the general population as well.  
This brings us to the third restriction, the transfer and application of the findings at this 
point in time. Our results cannot fully be generalised to sense of agency as a broader construct, as 
we only used one implicit method to measure intentional binding. However, as the validity of the 
interval estimation task has been questioned due to results of a meta-analysis (Tanaka et al., 2019), 
adding it as a second measure for intentional binding might not provide incremental validity. It 
could be interesting to see though, whether the effects we found can be replicated with another 
implicit method measuring the sense of agency. Besides intentional binding, a second implicit 
measure for sense of agency has been proposed: sensory attenuation. Sensory attenuation makes 
use of the fact that self-initiated action-effects are perceived less intense subjectively in direct 
comparison, e.g. a self-initiated tone is perceived less loud than a tone caused by others or machines 
(Sato, 2008; Weiss et al., 2011). However, the link between sensory attenuation and the sense of 
agency is still preliminary since the necessary preconditions are controversy (Dewey & Knoblich, 
2014) and some results suggest a partial dissociation of sensory attenuation and the sense of agency 
(Weller et al., 2017). It seems to be that sensory attenuation relies on predictive mechanisms only 
(Horváth, 2015), whereas the sense of agency is determined by both, predictive and postdictive 
mechanisms (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2019). Future research could focus on 
finding equivalently valid measures to replicate our findings. In terms of explicit ratings, it has been 
well established that self-reported agency is another facet of agency, so that effects can be expected 
to differ. 
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7.8 Outlook for Future Research: Open Questions 
As this work has set the focus on risk factors for criminal behaviour, emotional states 
enhancing the probability for underestimation of risks and engagement in reckless activities such 
as pleasure and sexual arousal (van Gelder, 2013) were considered as emotional states. However, 
in another context, more attention should be drawn to the emotional state sadness to investigate 
its influence during action performance on the feeling of control as it could have implications for 
depression for example. Sadness, with low arousal and negative valence, remains to complete the 
cluster for the two valence and arousal dimensions. Previous research indicates positive effects of 
sadness to some extent but not generally for all cognitive processes (Chepenik et al., 2007). Others 
claim broader benefits of negative affect for cognition, emotion, and interpersonal behaviour 
(Forgas, 2014).  
The effects of emotional states on sense of agency could also be studied from a treatment 
perspective. It could for example be investigated whether psychological interventions, such as 
mindfulness, that have been shown to improve emotion regulation skills (e.g. Roemer et al., 2015), 
are able to reduce the impact of emotional states on sense of agency. Deficits in emotion regulation 
have among others been found in anxiety disorders (Mennin et al., 2009), psychopathy (Garofalo 
et al., 2018) and narcissism (Zhang et al., 2015).  
Since differences in motivational processing and attention have been reported for different 
types of psychopathy (e.g. Sadeh & Verona, 2013), it might also be informative to differentiate 
components of psychopathy, namely coldheartedness, fearless dominance, and self-centred 
impulsivity. Specifically, recent research has suggested that individuals higher on the psychopathic 
trait fearless dominance are more reactive to positive stimuli, whereas those higher on self-centred 
impulsivity have a perceptual bias for negative stimuli (Yoon & Knight, 2015) which could impact 
the temporal binding in different ways. If the three subscales were to differ in terms of sense of 
agency, this would change the implications for legal culpability: psychopathy would matter less as 
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a broader construct and could be replaced by research fields for the three subscales instead 
demonstrating the individual responses to emotional states more specifically.  
Another great contribution to this stream of research would also be to focus more on 
underlying mechanisms causing interindividual differences. Subtle bodily cues for instance have 
received growing interest as they seem to affect our perception of the world, our actions and 
decisions (Herman & Tsakiris, 2020). According to previous findings, interoceptive processing 
regulates action generation, control, and self-attribution of action (A. C. Marshall et al., 2018) and 
the sense of agency is assumed to arise from the integration of interoceptive cues and exteroceptive 
sensory signals (Seth & Tsakiris, 2018). A recent study investigated the influence of interoceptive 
cues on the sense of agency with cardiac afferent signalling, the most commonly studied bodily 
cue, due to its regularity and frequency (Herman & Tsakiris, 2020). In this experiment, participants 
had a free choice between two stimuli presented on the screen. After a short delay, an outcome 
differing in valence (gain or loss), was presented auditorily either at the time of a heartbeat or in 
between two heartbeats. For the intentional binding measure, participants judged how much time 
had passed between their action and the outcome. Throughout, the action time (the time of the 
key press) was recorded with ECG to categorise, whether the action was made at a heartbeat or in 
between two heartbeats. Results showed that the sense of agency was higher for actions that were 
synchronous with heartbeats compared to actions between two heartbeats. This was unexpected 
as previous research had shown that events presented synchronous with heartbeat are perceived as 
more threatening and lead to inhibition of motor responses (Rae et al., 2018; D. R. Watson et al., 
2019) because the heartbeats cause more pressure, thus physical arousal that can be perceived via 
sensors in the arteries (Herman & Tsakiris, 2020). Other researchers have suggested that the sense 
of agency is generated by a combination of internal motoric signals and external sensory (Moore et 
al., 2009). Future research could examine what type of cues—internal or external—is more 
important for the sense of agency and whether interindividual variance in the selection of cues are 
able to explain variations in the stability or flexibility of the sense of agency. A method to measure 
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the reactivity to external stimuli is for instance sensory gating (e.g. Jones et al., 2016). In healthy 
individuals the phenomenon of sensory gating occurs when two stimuli are presented within a 
short interval as the reaction to second interval is significantly reduced measured via event-related 
potential. Thus, combining sensory gating and intentional binding could potentially reveal whether 
differences in the sensibility to external stimuli impacts the binding strength also.   
Lastly, sense of agency research could switch its focus to a more (socially) interactive field. 
While the effect of personality characteristics and emotional states on sense of agency simulate a 
court scenario for the defendant’s loss of control, the relation between one’s own sense of agency 
and evaluating other’s intentions is particularly important for the other side of the bench: the judge. 
In the current justice system, the judge sets the standard for the level of control they expect of the 
suspect. It would have crucial implications for current system if the judge’s standards for feeling of 
control are actually determined by their sense of agency rather than if they were generated by 
external cues. Studies in this stream of research indicate an influence of social interaction on our 
own sense of agency (Ulloa et al., 2019) and on the evaluation of other’s sense of agency (Reddish 
et al., 2020). In terms of an impact of social interaction on our own sense of agency, increased 
intentional binding in direct eye contact has been reported (Ulloa et al., 2019), potentially caused 
by enhanced self-processing. This effect occurred independent of the time of eye contact, either 
before action performance or as a result of the action. When we perform actions in social situations, 
eye contact acts as a cue intensifying our feeling of agency over actions and our feeling of 
responsibility over outcomes. The combined impact of emotional  expressions and eye contact on 
the sense of agency could be a next step to a better understanding of how our sense of agency 
adjusts in social interaction (Ulloa et al., 2019). With regards to the influence of social interaction 
on the judgement of other people’s agency, interesting results in terms of one’s own and others 
actions relation have been shown: When being synchronous in a joint action task, participants 
judged their task-partner’s sense of agency higher because the synchrony formed a sense of 
distributed agency (Reddish et al., 2020). We also know that some people show a bias towards 
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interpreting actions as intentional when judging accidental or arbitrary actions of others. If an 
action was performed unintentionally, but the information about the intention of an action is 
missing, there is a tendency to label it as intentional still. This construct is called intentionality bias 
(Rosset, 2008). In a first rapid and automatic response to behaviour, this intentionality bias is 
activated, and all actions are categorised as intentional. In a second process, a deliberate, more 
accurate analysis can overwrite this bias in case of evidence for unintentional behaviour. According 
to this theory, classifying behaviour is determined not only by the skill to recognise hints for 
intention but mainly through the skill to identify errors of interpretation and the ability to overwrite 
these errors (Rosset & Rottman, 2014). Investigating the relation between intentionality bias—
judging other people’s sense of agency—and one’s own sense of agency could clarify whether we 
assume that other people have the same level of control over their actions as though we feel 
ourselves. Or alternatively, whether we measure their actions and intentions with different 
standards from our own actions. This could have crucial implications for the objectivity of the 
judge in a court scenario.  
7.9 Implications and Conclusion  
Our results extended upon exciting evidence that sense of agency is responsive to emotional 
states (e.g. Christensen et al., 2019). These adjustments make it flexible and vulnerable at the same 
time. Previous studies had emphasised the importance of negative arousing states during action 
performance for the perception and feeling of control over actions (Christensen et al., 2019). We 
expanded these results to positive or ambiguous affective states such as sexual arousal and pleasure 
(Render et al., under review) as these are just as relevant as fear and anger in terms of motivation, 
underestimation of risks and engaging in reckless behaviour resulting in criminal actions (van 
Gelder, 2013). Interindividual differences in the sense of agency independent of emotional states 
were not found, although personality traits did show different pattern over time. Remarkably, the 
response to emotional states also interacted with personality traits which has not been observed 
before, traits of interest in this context were vulnerable narcissism showing an impaired feeling of 
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control over actions and consequences in sexual arousal, trait anxiety associated with decreased 
feeling of control over action but increased awareness of consequences, and psychopathy which 
was linked disconnection to the action outcomes but intact feeling of control over actions (Render 
et al., under review).  
Throughout we reported results for both components individually (Render et al., under 
review; Render & Jansen, 2020). Thus, we were able to show different responses to emotional 
states and in interactions with the personality traits for action and outcome binding supporting the 
view that they are driven by distinct mechanisms (Tanaka et al., 2019). We moreover found partial 
evidence that action binding is closer connected to the dopamine system: blink rates indexing 
dopaminergic activity and effects of sexual arousal were more pronounced for action binding than 
for outcome binding (Render et al., under review).   
Hence, the link between personality, emotions and the feeling of control highlights that the 
sense of agency is part of the foundation for our society in terms of legal responsibility (Haggard, 
2017; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore, 2016). We are legally culpable for our actions, but this 
presupposes that we have a sense of control over our actions and that we are aware of the 
consequences (Haggard & Chambon, 2012). If this sense of control is disrupted, however, a partial 
or total exemption from criminal liability can be effective (§20 Schuldunfähigkeit wegen seelischer 
Störungen, §21 verminderte Schuldfaehigkeit StGB) and treatment options should be considered 
in a less punitive and more resource-oriented way.  
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